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REFUGEES IN THE U.S.: PROTECTED
FROM PERSECUTION, OR VULNERABLE
TO UNJUST REMOVAL?
STACY HUBER*
INTRODUCTION
Since its founding, the United States has had a complicated
relationship with foreigners who find themselves wandering onto
its soil.1 On the one hand, this country was built, quite literally,
by the hands of persons from many different nations; without
them, we surely would not be the World Superpower that we are
today. 2 On the other hand exists what has been called an "almost
schizophrenic" immigration policy, which over the last few
hundred years has been at times shamefully discriminatory,
unnecessarily harsh, and painfully confusing. 3 We do, in fact,
* J.D. candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor Janice Villiers for her help and guidance in writing this piece, and
the firm DiRaimondo & Masi, LLP for their introduction to the field of immigration law
and the plight of refugees living in the United States.
1 See ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 146 (5th Ed. 2003) (discussing history of United States immigration). See
generally Theodore N. Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted:" The Sources and
Application of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 333 (1984) (explaining
relationship between United States and refugees that have "been driven out of their
country because of persecution and political conflict"); Bobana Ugarkovic, A Comparative
Study of Social and Economic Rights of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States
and the United Kingdom, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COM. L. 539 (2004) (discussing various
experiences of asylum seekers in United States).
2 See MICHAEL LEMAY & ELLIOTT ROBERT BARKAN, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES xxix (1999). In the early days of the United States,
there was an "obvious need" for labor to build up cities and to clear land on the frontier for
farms. Id. The growing cities were also in need of cheap labor, which immigration
provided. Id. at xxx. This continued after the civil war, when the "countries desire for
immigrants seemed insatiable." Id.; ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 152. This was
especially due to the building of railroads across the nation. Id.; see Sarah Paoletti,
Human Rights for All Workers: The Emergence of Protections for Unauthorized Workers in
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5 (2004).
3 GABRIEL J. CHIN ET AL.., IMMIGRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW 228 (2001). Although the United States has one of
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have one of the most generous and open immigration policies in
the world;4 as we know, Lady Liberty proudly calls from New
York harbor, "[G]ive me your tired, your poor, [y]our huddled
masses, yearning to breathe free. . .1 lift my lamp beside the
golden door."5 Despite this seemingly warm and open welcome,
the persons most desperate to "breathe free" (namely, thousands
of refugees who are fortunate enough to even make it to our
borders) are finding themselves in a sort of immigration limbo,
imposed by the United States failure to provide them the
protection which it has agreed to provide as a member of the
United Nations.6
the most generous and open immigration policies in the world, and though early
Americans welcomed immigrants as necessary to a growing nation, concerns regarding
certain groups lead to contrary views. Id. Racism, and "un-American" attitudes fed
immigration policies, which have reflected those attitudes. Id. These views, however, did
little during the colonial period and thereafter to curb immigration. Id. The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 marked the first racist, restrictionist immigration law. Id.; see
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1 at 153-55. At the end of the 19th century, attitudes
towards immigrants became particularly harsh because of changes in the country as a
whole (namely the closing of the U.S. frontier) increased industrialization and city
growth, the maintaining of traditions by eastern and southern European immigrants, and
galvanized the Catholic or Jewish religion of most new immigrants. Id. at 154. These
attitudes were reflected in immigration policies which began excluding certain persons
who were seen as undesirable-starting with prostitutes and convicts, and reaching so far
as any male who could not read or write. Id. at 154-55. See generally Andrew Stevenson,
Dreaming of an Equal Future for Immigrant Children: Federal and State Initiatives to
Improve Undocumented Students' Access to Postsecondary Education, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.
551, 552 (2004). While many illegal immigrants provide cheap labor, pay taxes, and have
children enrolled in local schools, they continue to struggle for the benefits of legal
residency. Id. In addition, the backlash that has resulted from September 11th manifests
itself in "the spread of cultural prejudice to increased border security[,]" thus attaining
legal status becomes even more difficult. Id.
4 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 146. "The United States has accepted more
refugees for permanent settlement than any other country in the world. The U.S.
currently accepts for permanent residence more than three-quarters of a million non-
citizens a year." Id.; see Melinda Smith, Criminal Defense Attorneys and Noncitizen
Clients: Understanding Immigrants, Basic Immigration Law & How Recent Changes in
Those Laws May Affect Your Cases, 33 AKRON L. REV. 163, 165 (1999). The United States
has long been known as the "nation of immigrants," where every family, with the
exception of Native Americans, has transplanted from another country. Id. But see Cox,
supra note 1, at 336. Although the United States is a member to the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, comments by high ranking officials suggest the United States may
be less willing to accept refugees in the future. Cox, supra note 1, at 336.
5 CHIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 228; see ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 146
(reflecting on the "darker side" of American immigration history, and stating "the image
of the golden door... is a tarnished one").
6 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural
Colloquium: The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: Introduction, 5 WASH. U. J.L. &
POLVY 7, 8 (2001). The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, drafted in 1945,
emphasizes the desire of the drafters to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person... " and "to achieve international cooperation
... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms." Id.; see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Text of the 1951
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For persons entering the United States as refugees, becoming a
Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of the U.S. is a crucial step on
the road to becoming a naturalized citizen, the most privileged
status a person not born here may enjoy.7 However, LPRs are not
afforded the same protections as U.S. citizens - the most crucial
difference being the fact that an LPR may be removed from the
U.S. based on grounds enumerated in the Immigration and
Naturalization Act ("INA").8 In contrast, according to
international law, a person with what is termed "refugee status,"
may only be removed in very limited circumstances.
A Case to Keep In Mind:
In Matter of V-S-, the Respondent is a native and citizen of
Belarus who was admitted to the United States as a refugee on
February 13, 1990.9 He adjusted to LPR status on June 18,
1991.10 In 2002, the Respondent was convicted of conspiracy to
commit extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and a 24-month
prison sentenced was imposed.1l He received a Notice to Appear
Convention and 1967 Protocol: Introductory Note 6, available at www.unhcr.org (last
visited February 2, 2005). The General Assembly of the United Nations met in Geneva in
1951 to draft a Convention regulating the legal status of refugees. Id. In an introduction
to a reprinting of the text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol, it is pointed out that accession to the Protocol (in which the United
States took part on November 1, 1968) requires a State to undertake to apply the
substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention to all refugees covered by the definition
within the Convention. Id. It further notes that the Convention and Protocol are the
principle international instruments for protecting refugees. Id. See generally Rex D.
Kahn, Why Refugee Status Should Be Beyond Judicial Review, 35 U.S.F.L. Rev. 57 (2000).
Kahn contends that the disparate treatment of refugees as reflecting refugee status is not
based on humanitarian concerns, but instead on political concerns. Id.
7 See Immigration and Naturalization Act §316(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (2003). Section
316 sets forth the requirements for naturalization. Id. The first requirement, titled
"residence," states that immediately preceding the filing an application for naturalization,
and being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien must reside in the United
States for five years. Id. The residency requirement is relaxed to three years for a person
married to a U.S. citizen. Id at §319(a). See generally Kerry E. Doyle & John J. Gallini,
Naturalization - The Final Frontier With The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL, VOLUME II, CHAPTER 23 (2004).
8 Immigration and Naturalization Act § 335, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1225 (describing grounds
for expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens); INA § 237, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1237
(describing classes of deportable aliens). See generally Iris Bennett, The
Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of 'Aggravated Felony"
Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1698 (1999) (noting that INA provides for removal
and deportation of non-citizens lawfully residing in United States based on certain
criminal convictions).
9 In re: V- S-, I. & N. Dec. A70-325-281, at 2 (Interlocutory Order Jan. 9, 2004).
10 Id.
11 Id.
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from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (now the
Department of Homeland Security), charging him with
removability pursuant to §237(a)(2)(A)(iii)12 as an alien who has
been convicted of an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43) of
the INA. 13
In support of his motion to terminate proceedings, the
Respondent argued that his status as a refugee was not properly
terminated before he was placed in removal proceedings - in
other words, that he retained his refugee status when he
adjusted to that of LPR, and that the refugee status remained,
even if his LPR status was divested.14 He further argued that
international refugee law, as interpreted by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"),15 should prevent
Refugee status from terminating upon becoming an LPR.16
The judge denied the motion to terminate, and in a footnote
argued that to implement such a policy would undermine United
States' immigration policy, and have a "chilling effect" on U.S.
acceptance of refugees.17  The Respondent's case remains
pending.
In opposition to what was asserted by the Immigration Judge
in Matter of V-S, to deport a person still deemed a refugee under
international law would contradict U.S. immigration policy in
that it would cheapen the validity of international agreements to
which the U.S. explicitly agreed.I8 It is quite clear that the
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 4.
15 In re: V-S-, I. & N. Dec. A70-325-281, at 4 (Interlocutory Order Jan. 9, 2004).
16 Id at 4.
17 Id. at 5 n.4. The Immigration Judge here specifically referenced the UNHCR,
stating that he rejects the position that refugee status should be permanent. Id. He
further stated that to implement the position of the UNHCR would mean a refugee was
not deportable for any reason. Id.
18 See generally Brian L. Aust, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Fifty Years
Later: Examining Expedited Removal and the Detention of Asylum Seekers Through the
Lens of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 107,
110-13 (1998) (discussing United States' deportation policies and almost complete
discretion that INS has in removing illegal immigrants unless the individual expresses a
fear of returning to their native country and manifests a desire to seek asylum); Joan
Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime, 94
A.J.I.L. 279 (2000) (discussing acceptance and prominence of temporary protection of
refugees in United States during 1990's due to forced migration from Kosovo); James C.
Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115,
116 (1997) (stating that while "governments proclaim a willingness to assist refugees as a
matter of political discretion or humanitarian goodwill, they appear committed to a
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United States has already adopted a policy that sets refugees
apart from other aliens residing in this country, and affords them
privileges unavailable to traditional immigrants and non-
immigrants alike.19 This country has an obligation to comply
with the provisions to which it agreed.
This Note will argue that upon becoming a LPR, a person's
refugee status does not terminate unless one of the narrow
terminating circumstances provided in the 1951 Convention to
the Status of Refugees, and its subsequent 1967 Protocol, occurs.
This Note will first discuss International Refugee law, its
definition of the term "refugee" and the international regulation
of such laws. It will then looks at the United States approach to
Refugees - both statutorily in the Immigration and
Naturalization Act ("INA"),20 and through case-law. The United
States' obligation to comply with international refugee laws to
which it is a Party is integrated throughout. This Note will
further discuss the exacerbating problem of increasingly harsh
deportation provisions of the INA, and its particularly
detrimental effect on LPR's who entered as refugees.
I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
A. What is a Refugee?
Under international law, the refugee is in a unique position, in
that the term "refugee" implicates a person "among the world's
pattern of defensive strategies designed to avoid international legal responsibility toward
involuntary migrants").
19 INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1231; INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101. The INA
provides refugees protection through the refugee definition in §101(a)(42)(A), and basing
one restriction on removal in §241(b)(3) of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention as modified by
the 1967 Protocol. Id. The restriction on removal states that the Attorney General may
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id. at
§101(a)(42)(A). This restriction mirrors the requirements of being designated a refugee,
as well as the prima-facie requirements for being granted asylum in the United States. Id.
Obtaining "refugee" status has its benefits, including permanent residence, access to state
benefits and immunity from deportation. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Boundaries in the Field
of Human Rights: Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy
and Human Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 159 (2002).
20 INA § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2004).
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most unfortunate," 21 while status as a refugee in theory affords
privileges not enjoyed by other types of immigrating or displaced
persons. 22 As a recognized refugee, such a person has the benefit
of specialized programs for relief and assistance. 23 International
treaties, to which over 140 nations have become party to, set
forth extensive and specific protections for refugees. 24 However,
the international attempt to protect persons designated as
refugees is plagued with problems and inconsistencies. 25 At the
center of these problems is a tension between a nation's
sovereignty and basic humanitarian principles, which attempt to
assist those who have been affected by human rights abuses,
collapse of government, or aggression. 26 Unfortunately, refugees
21 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 783. Refugees can be victims of
persecution, war, or natural disaster, and so forced to leave their native countries because
of that oppression or destruction. Id. This "ordinary, social perception" of refugee status is
different from the "Convention definition" which is at issue here. Id.; see Hathaway, supra
note 18, at 116. A Convention refugee, in sum, is a person who is outside his or her
country because she believes "her civil or political status puts her at risk of serious harm
in that country, and her own government cannot or will not protect her." Id.; see United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Basic Facts, at www.unhcr.ch (last visited
February 2, 2005). A refugee has the right to safe asylum, as well as the right to "the
same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including
freedom of thought, of movement, and freedom from torture and degrading treatment."
Id.
22 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 783 (discussing privileges afforded to
refugees); see also GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Second
Ed. 1996) (discussing formation of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). See
generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 18, at 279 (discussing problems of temporary protection
of refugees in context of evacuated Kosovars).
23 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 783 (discussing United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and its protective role towards refugees); see also Hathaway,
supra note 18, at 157 (stating "some states erroneously believe that they are free to
determine what rights will be granted to temporarily protected refugees," when in fact
refugee rights under 1951 Convention actually apply); cf. Fitzpatrick, supra note 18, at
280 (noting various international refugee protection efforts).
24 See United Nations Treaty Collection, States Parties to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+zwwBmeim-g-wwwwmwwwwwwwxFqzvqX
sK69s6mFqA72ZR0gRfZNhFqA72ZROgRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBzFqmRbZAFqA72ZROgRfZND
zmxwwwwwwwlFqmRbZ/opendoc.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (listing participants of
1967 Convention and their accession or succession dates); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 783 (stating two most important treaties are 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol); cf. Ugarkovic, supra note 1, at 540 (noting provisions being developed to assist
refugees).
25 See Hathaway, supra note 18, at 115 (stating international refugee law is in crisis,
and that many governments are withdrawing from their legal obligations to provide
protection, despite growing international crisis); see also Bhabha, supra note 19, at 156
(noting that many human rights violations take place while refugees are migrating to
foreign countries). See generally Ugarkovic, supra note 1, at 539 (discussing individual
obstacles to obtaining refugee status).
26 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 22, at V (introducing concept of refugee status as a
legal principle); see also Khan, supra note 6, at 57 (asserting that persecution based
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may still be denied even temporary protection, a safe return to
their homes or compensation. 27 As recently recognized by the
President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the
world's refugee problem has become a "tragedy of global scope"
encompassing all regions of the globe.28  This problem is
exacerbated when a refugee is not only a victim of persecution
and suffering at the hands of her native country and government,
but is a victim of violations of "principles underpinning the
United Nations Charter."29
i. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
Its 1967 Protocol
The international community began to assume responsibility
for protecting and assisting refugees early in the twentieth
century with the formation of the League of Nations. 30 After
World War II, a need for an international definition of what
constituted a refugee led to the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees ("1951 Convention").31
definitions of refugees creates an "unfair dichotomy of victims"); Ugarkovic, supra note 1,
at 549 (discussing problems associated with seeking refugee status); cf. Bhabha, supra
note 19, at 156 (discussing human rights violations).
27 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 22, at V (explaining that refugee law remains "an
incomplete legal regime" and that legal status of a refugee in large part depends on States
fulfilling their obligations, and respecting principles of non-refoulement); see Bhabha,
supra note 19, at 159 (noting benefit of achieving refugee status is possibility of being
reunited with family members). See generally Ugarkovic, supra note 1, at 539 (noting
isolation felt by many refugees).
28 See Report of the Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, Item 13, U.N. Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/10 (2002), available at www.unhcr.ch (last
visited August 16, 2005) [hereinafter Ministerial Meeting]; see also Hathaway, supra note
18, at 115 (stating International Refugee law is in crisis); cf. Ugarkovic, supra note 1, at
539 (discussing countries' difficult decision between protecting asylum seekers and
preventing abuse of the system).
29 See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 28, Annex at Introductory Statements 113
(stating that because of these violations, "concerted efforts are still needed to ensure the
realization of the ideals on which [the charter] is based").
30 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1992 Ed.), at 2, available at www.unhcr.ch (last
visited August 16, 2005) [hereinafter Handbook] (leading to many international
agreements made for benefit of refugees); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 18, at 279
(analyzing international legislation). See generally Bhabha, supra note 19, at 155
(discussing role of advocates in developing protective legislation).
31 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951). Although the original Convention was to apply only to
persons who had a well founded fear of being persecuted as a result of events occurring
prior to January 1951, this was later modified in the Protocol to protect persons affected
after that date. Id.; see Erika Feller, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural
Colloquium: The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: The Evolution of the
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Arguably the most influential and important document in
defining and discussing the international treatment of refugees
resulted from the 1951 Convention. 32 The 1951 Convention
provided a detailed framework of how to handle the
overwhelming refugee dilemma that plagued the world.33
However, in order for the Convention's purposes and goals to be
accomplished, the cooperation and compliance by Party states
was, and is, obviously required. 34 For example, as stated in the
"Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol," ("the
Handbook"),35 the determination of refugee status is "incumbent
upon the Contracting State in whose territory the refugee applies
International Refugee Protection Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 129, 131 (2001). After
the rise of Nazism and communism, millions of refugees fled their countries to escape
persecution. In response, the 1951 Convention became the first, and remains the only,
"binding refugee protection instrument of a universal character." Id.
32 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951). The Convention, as well as the 1967 Protocol contains
three different types of provisions. Id.; see Handbook, supra note 30, at 4. Most
important to this discussion is the basic definition of who is and who is not a refugee, and
who, having been a refugee, ceases to be one. Id. The legal status of refugees and their
rights and duties in their country of refuge is also determined in the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol, as well as the implementation of those instruments. Id.; see Daniel J.
Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition 45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 735 (1998). For over
the past fifty years, the 1951 Convention has served as the cornerstone for international
understanding and response to the problem of refugees. Id.; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill,
Refugees and Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century: More Lessons Learned From the
South Pacific 12 PAC. RIM L. & POLCY J. 23 (2003). The Convention and Protocol remain
the central features in today's regime of refugee protection. Id.
33 See 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951). The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol contain
three types of provisions: one giving the basic definition of who is, and who ceases to be, a
refugee; the legal status, rights, and duties of refugees in their country of refuge; and the
implementation of the above administratively and diplomatically. Id.; see Handbook,
supra note 30, at 12. The Handbook explains the three main provisions of the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Id.; see also Feller, supra note 31, at 131-32. The 1951
Convention was drafted to instill baseline principles that would protect the many refugees
fleeing their countries. Id.
34 See Handbook, supra note 30, at 12. The cooperation of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees is created in the Convention to help contracting states
implement and follow its duties under the Convention. Id.; see Lori Adams, Refugee
Rights in the U.S. Scaled Back By Recent Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Are We Violating the
United Nations Refugee Convention?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 807, 810 (2003). The
1951 Convention requires member states to treat refugees as citizens. Id. This would
require member states to apply their laws and make their courts available to refugees. Id.
Member states pledged commitment to the 1951 Convention and also expanded its use to
provide a basis for refugee protection. See Taylor H. Garrett, Book Review. Refugee
Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International
Protection, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 751, 752 (2004).
35 See Handbook, supra note 30, at Forward V. The Handbook was created in order
to provide guidance to governments in regards to procedures and criteria for determining
refugee status. Id. It breaks down and explains the various components of the definition
of refugee set out in the 1951 Convention. Id.
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for recognition of refugee status."36  In other words, the
implementation of the Convention's regulations lies with the
government of party states.37
In order to qualify as a refugee under the 1951 Convention,
and the 1967 Protocol as enforced by the UNHCR, a person must:
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and
owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.38
The Handbook clarifies each element of the definition and
provides a framework as to who meets such criteria. 39 However,
while both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol provide
legal redress that was previously not available to victims of
human rights abuses, 4O there is still much debate as to the actual
meanings of the terms of the definition.41
36 See Handbook, supra note 30, at Forward II.
37 See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Paul T. Lufkin,
ed. 1999) (stating Convention in essence requires state party to provide protection and to
guarantee specific rights to persons who face serious violations of their human rights
based on certain grounds); Feller, supra note 31, at 132 (highlighting that state
cooperation is essential to ameliorate problem of refugees); Teresa L. Peters, International
Refugee Law and the Treatment of Gender Based Persecution: International Initiatives as
a Model and Mandate for National Reform, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 230
(1996) (noting that Convention established mores and norms governing refugee rights).
38 189 U.N.T.S. 137, Article 1(A)(2) (1951).
39 See Handbook, supra note 30, at Forward V. As stated here, the explanations in
the Handbook are based on information accumulated by the UNHCR. Id.; see also Peters,
supra note 37, at 231. The handbook, as published by the UNHCR, interprets the Protocol
and the Convention. Id.; Adams, supra note 34, at 807. The Convention defines the term
"refugee, describes their rights, and outlines the legal obligations of the United Nations
member States." Id.
40 See Steinbock, supra note 32, at 735 (discussing ambiguity in interpreting the
definitions); see also Peters, supra note 37, at 230 (noting that 1951 Convention marked
United Nations effort to formalize rights and protections for refugees). But see Feller,
supra note 31, at 130 (stating international community was aware of providing
protections to refugees beginning in 1920s).
41 See Steinbock, supra note 32, at 736 (focusing on purpose and objectives of refugee
definition is probably most beneficial); see also Feller, supra note 31, at 136 (suggesting
that 1951 Convention continues to complicate current migration); Garrett, supra note 34,
at 757 (hinting that over-broadening social group categorization may negatively effect
refugee protection).
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On November 6, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued a
Proclamation entitled "Multilateral Protocol and Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees."4 2 This proclamation set out
what the United States explicitly agreed to in accepting the 1967
Protocol. Most important to this discussion is the general
definition of refugee as listed in Article I of the Convention, 43 the
co-operation of the National Authorities with the United
Nations, 44 the Exemption from Reciprocity provisions in Article
7,45 Expulsion provisions in Article 32,46 and Prohibition of
Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement") of Article 33.47
Article 7's "Exemption from Reciprocity" states that a
Contracting State shall afford to refugees the same treatment as
is afforded to aliens generally except where this Convention
contains more favorable provisions.48 In the case of a refugee who
has been granted LPR status, this provision should prevent the
court from deporting them from the United States as a non-
refugee LPR would be deported, on the theory that the provisions
of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol contain more favorable
provisions protecting such persons. 49 Additionally, the Article 32
42 See LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 267 (documenting proclamation and
Protocol); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 22, at 409-12 (outlining provisions of Protocol);
Adams, supra note 34, at 808 (noting United States ratification of Protocol in 1968).
43 See LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 267. This portion of the Proclamation states
that articles 2 to 34 of the Convention apply to refugees, and adopt the definition of
refuges in Article I of the Convention, without the limitation of persons being involved in
events prior to January 1, 1951. Id. It also notes that the Protocol shall be applied by the
party States without any geographical limitation. Id.
44 See LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 267 (stating authority of UNHCR); Peters,
supra note 37, at 231 (noting that those who agreed to Protocol were also bound by
Convention articles); see also Adams, supra note 34, at 808 (stating United States, by
agreeing to Protocol, is obligated by provisions of 1951 Convention).
45 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 7, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, (Jan. 31, 1967); see LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 267 (stating how refugees
should be treated by states a party to the Protocol).
46 Protocol, supra note 45, at Art. 32; see also LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 267
(discussing expulsion).
47 Protocol, supra note 45, at Art. 38; see also LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 268
(discussing refoulement).
48 Protocol, supra note 45, at Art. 7. This Article also provides that after a period of
three years residence, all refugees shall enjoy "exemption from legislative reciprocity." Id.
49 See Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that LPR status is
not equivalent to status of United States national and that LPR is still arguably a refugee
under the Convention and afforded its protections); Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in
Congressional Fishnets- Immigration Law's New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
589, 607 (1998) (writing that United States' binding itself to Convention meant much less
discretion in deporting refugees); Elizabeth Glazer, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
Asylum Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1157, 1166 (1985) (stating that "non-refoulement"
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provisions, read in conjunction with the Article 33 provisions,
state that a lawfully present refugee cannot be expelled save on
grounds of national security or public order.DO Furthermore, no
contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner to a place where his life or freedom would be
threatened on one of the grounds listed in the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol. 51
It is important to note that contracting states are not without
recourse against a refugee who is becoming a danger to society -
the Protocol states that the protective provisions do not apply to
refugees against whom a State has "reasonable grounds" for
regarding as "dangerous to the security of the country" or who
"after being convicted of a particularly serious crime,"
"constitutes a danger to the community of that country."52
However, the INA deportation provisions which apply to
traditional immigrants and non-immigrants reach far beyond
those persons who may reasonably be considered a danger to the
security of the United States. 53 As discussed below, the blanket
provision of Convention theoretically affords substantial safeguards and rights to
refugees).
50 See LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 268. Article 32 also provides that expulsion
of a refugee shall only be in pursuance of a decision in accordance with due process, and
that refugees should be allowed a reasonable time to seek legal admission into another
country. Id.; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 18, at 296. Exceptions to Article 32 of the
Convention can only be made for reasons of national security. Id.; Hathaway, supra note
18, at 160. The UNHCR's commitment to non-refoulement is an essential element of
temporary protection, as embodied by Article 33. Id. Pursuant to Article 32, refugees
lawfully in a territory may not be expelled, except for reasons of public order or national
security. Id.
51 See Protocol, supra note 45, at Art. 1. In defining "refugee", Article 1 outlines the
social or political circumstances necessary for consideration. Id.; see LEMAY & BARKAN,
supra note 2, at 268. As stated later on, this includes those fearing persecution based on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Id. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 18, at 284-85. The UNHCR is
committed to expanding the definition of refugee, as individuals subject to persecution,
found in the 1951Convetion, to include refugees from armed conflict and war. Id.
52 LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 268; see Hathaway, supra note 18, at 160.
Hathaway points out that pursuant to Article 32 of the Convention, refugees who are
lawfully in the territory of an asylum state cannot be expelled at all, "except for reasons of
national security, or public order." Id.
53 See INA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii)(stating that "any alien who is convicted of an aggravated
felony [defined in INA §101(a)(43)] at any time after admission is deportable"); see, e.g.,
INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining theft or burglary (including
receipt of stolen property) for which the term of imprisonment at least one year [sic] as
"aggravated felony"); INA § 101(a)(43)(J), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(43)(J) (including offenses
related to gambling for which sentence of one year or more may be imposed); INA §
101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (including "an offense relating to commercial
bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of
which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year").
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application of Section 237 to all aliens has the effect of deporting
LPR's, many with numerous long-term ties to this country, for
crimes which posed no physical danger to anyone, and would
generally be considered "minor" to the population as a whole.
When balanced against the danger of sending a refugee back to a
place in which he has established a well founded fear of
returning to, this is clearly a violation of the principles
established in the 1951 Convention and Protocol, and results in
grossly disproportionate punishment to the LPR-refugee. 54
The fact that the United States is one of the many states that
are parties to the Convention or Protocol is critically important
when reviewing the rights of a person who has been granted
refugee status in the United States.55 Besides the actual act of
accession in which the United States took part 1968, the U.S. has
several times recommitted itself to complying with the 1967
Protocol, and is bound to comply with the instruments and
organizations which uphold it.56
54 See Coonan, supra note 49, at 607 (concluding that United States has never fully
complied with definition of what constitutes danger to the country); Jacqueline P. Ulin, A
Common Sense Reconstruction of the INA's Crime-Related Removal System: Eliminating
the Caveats from the Statue of Liberty's Welcoming Words, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1549, 1551
(2000) (writing that INA reaches far past serious crimes but also to "those who have
committed only minor offenses as well"); see, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that conviction of "two misdemeanor petty theft or public
transportation fare evasion charges -- turnstile jumping in the New York City subway
system" can equal crimes of moral turpitude and result in deportation).
55 See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 28. According to the "Ministerial Meeting" held
in Geneva in December of 2001, 141 states are party to the original 1951 Convention and
139, including the United States, are party to the 1967 Protocol. Id. See generally Jenny-
Brooke Condon, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 213 (2002).
The Protocol, which presently has 139 signatory countries, incorporates the Convention,
eliminates its temporal restrictions, and extends its coverage beyond Europe. Id.; Beate
Anna Ort, International and U.S. Obligations Toward Stowaway Asylum Seekers, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 285, 324 (1991). As a party to the Protocol, the United States has agreed to
cooperate with the UNHCR and to supervise in the application of the Protocol. Id.
56 See Bobbie Marie Guerra, A Tortured Construction: The Illegal Immigration and
Immigrant Responsibility Act's Express Bar Denying Criminal Aliens Withholding of
Deportation Defies the Principals of International Law, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 941, 986 (1997)
(arguing that "Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act has again placed the
United States in a position inconsistent with its obligations under the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"); Kris Ann Balser Moussette, Female
Genital Mutilation and Refugee Status in the United States - A Step in the Right
Direction, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 380 (1996) (noting that nearly fifteen years
after United States signed onto Protocol, Congress incorporated and affirmed U.S.
obligations under Protocol with passage of Refugee Act of 1980); Inna Nazarova,
Alienating "Human"from "Right" U.S. and UK Non-Compliance with Asylum Obligations
Under International Human Rights Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 335, 1339-51 (arguing
that since September 11th, United States has further eroded their commitments under
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ii. Cooperation with UNHCR
A specialized office of the United Nations, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") was established by
the General Assembly of the United Nations to "provide
protection and seek permanent solutions for the problem of
refugees."57 The UNHCR assists both governments and private
organizations to meet its goals, a responsibility that it considers
an "international protection mandate." 58 The statute of the
UNHCR, written in 1950, states the organization will accomplish
its goals by "[p]romoting the conclusion and ratification of
international conventions for the protection of refugees,
supervising their application and proposing amendments
thereto."59 The supervisory responsibility of the UNHCR was
reiterated in Article II of the Protocol. 60 President Johnson's
proclamation adopting the Protocol specifically "undertook to
cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ... and shall in particular facilitate
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1967 Protocol, 1951 Convention, and American
Convention on Human Rights and thus eroded rights of refugees).
57 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 22, at 7 (discussing formation of UNHCR); see also
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 783 (discussing UNHCR). See generally United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Basic Facts, at http://www.unhcr.org/ (last
visited February 10, 2005) (explaining formation of UNHCR in 1950).
58 See Interpreter Releases: Report and Analysis of Immigration and Nationality
Law, Becoming an LPR Does Not Terminate Refugee Status, UNHCR Says, Vol. 80, No.
11, Appendix III, 423 (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter UNHCR Opinion Letter]. The UNHCR
was established in 1950 as one of several attempts by the international community to
protect refugees. Id. Although originally given a three-year mandate to help resettle 1.2
million European refugees left homeless after World War II, its mandate was extended
every five years thereafter as the international refugee crisis grew. Id.; see also United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, What is UNHCR?, at http://www.unhcr.org/
(last visited February 10, 2005). The UNHCR asserts, "international protection is the
cornerstone of the agency's work." Id.
59 UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 423 (quoting statute of UNHCR, from
Annex 1, at 1.6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/428(V) (1950)).
60 See generally Michael Rowan, The Latest Chapter in the Saga of Spiritless Law:
Detaining Haitian Asylum Seekers as a Violation of the Spirit and the Letter of
International Law, 3 MARGINS 371, 383 (2003). On November 6, 1968, Lyndon B. Johnson
gave a proclamation titled, 'Multilateral Protocol and Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees." Id. At that time, the United States agreed to apply Articles 1 to 34 of the
Convention to refugees, and to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. Id.; see LEMAY & BARKAN, supra note 2, at 267. The United
States officially signed on November 1, 1968. Id.; see Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum
Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 262
(1984). The UNHCR was designed as an organ of the United Nations charged with the
supervision of member state parties to the Protocol. Id.
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its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the
present Protocol. '1
Today, the UNHCR remains one of the world's principal
humanitarian agencies. 62 Its programs and protections are
approved by an Executive Committee of sixty-four member states
that meet annually in Geneva. 63 The UNHCR aims to ensure
"respect for a refugee's basic human rights and ensuring that no
person will be returned involuntarily to country where he or she
has reason to fear persecution."64 Also, the UNHCR is
responsible for monitoring government compliance with
international refugee laws.65 By accepting the terms of the
Protocol, the U.S. agreed to comply with the UNHCR's
recommendations and authority in regulating the treatment of
refugees. 66
61 UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 423 (citing 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S.
150).
62 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, What is UNHCR?, at
http://www.unhcr. org/ (last visited February 2, 2005). UNHCR has a staff of around 6,200
persons, and is helping approximately 20 million people in more than 120 countries. Id.
Over its history, it has provided assistance to at least 50 million people. Id.; see also J.
Oloka-Onyango, The Plight of the Larger Half: Human Rights, Gender Violence and the
Legal Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Africa, 24 DENV. J. INT'L &
POL'y 349 (1996). The UNHCR is identified as "the main international agency concerned
with protecting rights of refugees and the internally displaced." Id. For a summary of the
international contributions of the UNHCR and the 20 largest programs the UNHCR
undertook in 1984, see Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries
of Asylum, 80 A.J.I.L. 532, 550-51 (1986).
63 See What is UNHCR?, supra note 62 (describing staff of UNHCR); see also Jennifer
Moore, Restoring the Humanitarian Character of U.S. Refugee Law Lessons from the
International Community, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 51, 53 (canvassing composition and
importance of executive committee); Keith D. Nunes, Detentions of Political, Racial and
Religious Persecutees and Dissenters: Asylum and Human Dignity, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 811, 854-55 (2000) (discussing make up and functions of executive committee in
matters such as, approving the "annual assistance programs of the High Commissioner"
and advising "the High Commissioner, in exercising statutory functions, especially
international protection").
64 See What is UNHCR?, supra note 62. The two basic aims of the organization are
"to protect refugees and to seek ways to help them restart their lives in a normal
environment." Id.
65 See What is UNHCR?, supra note 62 (stating UNHCR's job is to lead and
coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems
worldwide); see also Rachel Bien, Nothing to Declare but Their Childhood: Reforming U.S.
Asylum Law to Protect the Rights of Children, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 797, 803 n.24 (2004)
(stating that 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol give UNHCR power to supervise
member compliance); Ralph Wilde, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How
UNHCR Governance of "Development" Refugee Camps Should be Subject to International
Human Rights Law, 1 YALE H.R. & DEV. L. J. 107, 114-15 (1998) (noting UNHCR's role in
governing state compliance with international refugee law).
66 See Protocol, supra note 45, at Art. 2 (stating that all parties to Protocol have duty
to assist UNHCR in supervising Protocol's application and to supply all information
requested regarding refugees); see also Elizabeth Kay Harris, Economic Refugees:
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iii. Cancellation and Cessation of Refugee Status under the
Convention and Protocol
As there are specific criteria for determining who may be
recognized as a refugee, there are also specific instances that
must be met in order to revoke that status.67 Generally, once
refugee status has been determined, it remains in effect until
ended either because one of the cessation clauses of the 1951
Convention applies, or on the basis of one of the exclusion
provisions of Article 1F(a) or (c) of the 1951 Convention. 68
On March 17, 2003, the Interpreter Releases immigration law
publication reproduced a UNHCR letter written to immigration
law practitioner Robert Pauw who had asked for advice on the
issue of whether refugee status "ceases" or "terminates" once a
refugee becomes a lawful permanent resident. 69 His client, Mr.
Simonvskiy, had appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that removal proceedings were
procedurally flawed because the Immigration Judge lacked the
authority to conduct the hearing, given there had been no prior
termination of his refugee status under section 207(c)(4) of the
Unprotected in the United States by Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 269, 275 (1993) (explicating UNHCR's stance on refugee treatment and process
leading to United States ratification); Bien, supra note 65, at 803 n.24 (stating that 1951
convention and 1967 Protocol grant UNHCR the power to supervise member compliance).
67 See Sibylle Kapferer, Cancellation of Refugee Status, DEPT OF INT'L PROTECTION,
UNHCR at 1, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/protect (2003) (discussing issue of
cancellation as arising when recognized refugee by state under 1951 Convention is
subsequently found not to have been entitled to that benefit); see also Joan Fitzpatrick et
al., Current Issues in Cessation of Protection Under Article IC of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and Article 1.4 of the 1969 OAU Convention, UNHCR at 1, available at
http://www.unhcr.ch (June 2001) (discussing cessation clauses and their lack in
addressing many contemporary issues which arise in context of termination of refugee
status); Fitzpatrick, supra note 18, at 284 n.42 (2000) (explaining amount of proof
required under 1951 Convention to terminate person's refugee status).
68 19 U.S.T. 6259 (1951). Although the 1951 Convention does not directly address
cancellation, a ground for cancellation as provided by in the law of a state must exist for
cancellation to occur. Id.; see Kapferer, supra note 67, at 1. In contrast, the cessation
clauses are explicitly listed in the Convention and Protocol, although they were "long
neglected" as a subject of refugee law. Id. But see Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 1. Despite
the multifaceted framework provided in the Conventions, cessation of refugee status
remains a subject of confusion for states dealing with issues of termination of
international protection. Id.
69 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 423 (stating "LPR status does not
lend' refugee status"). See generally Harris, supra note 66, at 301-03 (explaining United
States' policy of repatriation); Vic Ullom, Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and
Customary International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 115, 138 n.154 (2001)
(indicating UNHRC's Handbook on repatriation is silent on termination of refugee
status).
214 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:1
INA.70 The Court never reached the issue at hand, because it
held the Petitioner's failure to raise the issue in proceedings
below removed its jurisdiction, and so the court dismissed the
petition. 7 1
The UNHCR reiterates much of what has already been stated
in the Protocol and Handbook, but points out the specific portions
of the Protocol and Convention Cessation clause into which an
LPR would have to fall in order for refugee status to be
revoked. 72 Pointing first to the Handbook for guidance, the
UNHCR notes that the application of the six cessation clauses is
to be applied restrictively. 73 It goes on to state that the cessation
clauses are not penal in nature and are not meant to be used for
the purpose of "punishing" a refugee otherwise found to meet the
refugee definition. 74 The first four cessation clauses consist of
situations where the refugee has voluntarily done something that
70 See Simonovskiy v. Ashcroft, 71 Fed.Appx. 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2003). The court later
held that failure to raise issues below constituted failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and deprived the Court of jurisdiction. Id.; see also INA § 207, 8 USCA §
1157(c)(4) (2004); INA § 209, 8 USCA § 1159 (2004).
71 See Simonovskiy, 71 Fed. Appx. at 621 (dismissing Petitioner's case for lack of
jurisdiction); see also 8 USCA § 1252 (2004) (explaining grounds for Court's dismissal);
Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating "[flailure to raise an issue
below constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies and 'deprives this court of
jurisdiction to hear the matter"') (quoting Vargas v. United States Dep't of Immigration
and Naturalization, 831 F.2d 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1987)).
72 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 424-25 (listing and explaining
cessation clauses). See generally Lindsay A. Franke, Not Meeting the Standard: U.S.
Asylum Law & Gender-Related Claims, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 605, 607 (2000)
(maintaining that UNHCR urges a case-by-case analysis regarding whether someone has
or will suffer persecution); Kathleen Marie Whitney, There is No Future for Refugees in
Chinese Hong Kong, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 1, 11 (1998) (explaining UNHCR's
prohibition of contracting states against expelling or returning refugees to countries
where their lives or freedom are at risk).
73 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 424 (stating "[g]iven that the
application of such clauses results in the loss of refugee status, they are to be applied
restrictively"); Handbook, supra note 30, at 116 (stating "[t]he cessation clauses are
negative in character and are exhaustively enumerated ... [tihey should therefore be
interpreted restrictively, and no other reasons may be adduced by way of analogy to
justify the withdrawal of refugee status"); Susan M. Akram and Terry Rempel,
Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for
Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1, 9-10 (2004) (describing one cessation clause
and noting UNHCR's intent for restrictive interpretation of the clause).
74 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 424 (stating that cessation clauses
are not penal or meant to punish refugees); see also Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of
Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation of Refugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary
Protection, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 348-50 (1999) (explaining purpose behind cessation
clauses and when they should be used); Jeremy R. Tarwater, Analysis and Case Studies of
the "Ceased Circumstances" Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 15 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 563, 564-69 (2001) (stating that changed conditions in refugee's country of
origin are required in order to invoke last two cessation clauses of 1951 Refugee
Convention).
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would redact the status, and the remainder deal with conditions
in the home country which no longer warrant international
protection.75
According to the UNHCR letter, the most relevant clause to the
LPR situation is clause 1C(3), which ceases refugee status when
a person "has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the
protection of the country of his new nationality."76 The UNHCR
further states that once a refugee naturalizes, 77 he or she should
in theory be in a position to enjoy the protection afforded by the
country to its citizens. 78 Importantly, the granting of such status
75 UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 425; Protocol, supra note 45, at General
Provisions art. 1. The cessation clauses are as follows:
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his
nationality, or
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his
new nationality; or
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside
which he remained owing to a fear of persecution; or He can no longer, because the
circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have
ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of
his nationality...
(5) being a person who has no nationality, he is, because the circumstances in
connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able
to return to the country of his former habitual residence...
Id.; see Tarwater, supra note 74, at 563-64. The first four clauses relate "to a change in
the personal circumstance of the refugee brought about by the refugee's own act, and
which result in national protection so that international protection becomes unnecessary."
Id.; see Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 13. The second set includes the last two clauses
"which relate to a change in the objective circumstances surrounding a refugee in such a
way that international protection is no longer justified." Id. Since refugee status is
premised upon a lack of national protection against prosecution or danger, cessation
logically ends when these risks are eliminated. Id.
76 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 425 n.8 (quoting to analogous
provision to Article 1(C)(3) in INA § 208(c)(2)(E)). See generally David A. Martin,
Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48-49 (2001) (arguing aliens should be afforded
due process rights on par with citizens).
77 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 17 n.14. After a period of lawful permanent
residence, former refugees can become eligible for naturalization. Id.; see INA § 316, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1427 (West 2003). A refugee may naturalize pursuant to the traditional means
under § 316 of the INA, after adjusting status to Lawful Permanent Resident pursuant to
INA §209. Id. See generally Arnold Rochvarq, Reforming the Administrative
Naturalization Process: Reducing Delays While Increasing Fairness, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
397, 397-98 (1995). To note, individuals who oppose all organized government or are
members of totalitarian political parties are prohibited from becoming naturalized
citizens. Id.
78 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 425 (noting that international
protection would no longer be necessary once naturalization has occurred); see also
Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 32-33 (suggesting that when refugees naturalize in state
of refuge, they gain protection against persecution in state of origin). See generally
Martin, supra note 76, at 48 (explaining that certain categories of aliens enjoy stronger
measures of constitutional protection than others).
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is not enough to trigger cessation under the convention. In the
United States, naturalization will likely lead to this protection,
but it is not guaranteed. 79
More specifically, the UNHCR points out that LPR status is
clearly not a sufficient basis for the cessation of refugee status.8 0
Given the exhaustive nature of the cessation clauses, there is no
way to justify the withdrawal of refugee status upon adjustment
of status to that of an LPR.81 Furthermore, within the INA, there
is nothing in the text of the statutes to suggest that refugee
status ceases upon a grant of adjustment of status.8 2
Importantly, the UNHCR supports the position that LPR
status does not confer the degree of protection that is necessary
to ensure that international protection - i.e. that granted to
79 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 425-26. The letter notes that
UNHCR's Guidelines on the Application of Cessation Clauses states that:
two conditions therefore must be fulfilled in order to consider that a person who has
acquired a new nationality enjoys the protection of new nationality: (1) the new
nationality must be effective, in the sense that it must correspond to a genuine link
between the individual and the State; and (2) the refugee must be able and willing to
avail himself or herself of the protection of the government of his or her new
nationality. Only with effective national protection has a durable solution to the
refugee's situation been achieved.
Id.; see Note on the Cessation Clauses, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.30, at 15 (May 1997),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch. For the refugee to be considered as having acquired
protection, the refugee must secure all the rights and benefits entailed by possession of
the nationality of the country. Id.; see Fitzpatrick, supra note 75 at, 352 n.50. However, in
the United States, changed conditions in a refugee's state of origin is an inadequate basis
for stripping her of citizenship through denaturalization. Id.
80 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 426 (basing this contention on text
of 1951 Convention); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 75, at 352 n.50 (noting that in
United States, elimination of a risk of persecution is not lawful grounds for deportation of
refugee who has adjusted her status to LPR). See generally INA § 237, 8 U.S.C.S § 1227
(2004) (outlining general classes of deportable aliens).
81 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 426. The UNHCR further provides
an example to demonstrate that the Convention drafters were quite purposeful in their
drafting, stating that a proposal to cease refugee status based on a lengthy residence was
withdrawn. Id. They further note that some refugees may be hesitant to naturalize for
various reasons. Id.; see Note on the Cessation Clauses, supra note 79, at 6. Since the
cessation clauses are exhaustive, a refugee's status is maintained until one of the
cessation clauses can be invoked; in any case, refugees should not be subjected to constant
or regular reviews of their refugee status. Id.; see Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 17 n.14.
However, in the United States, adjustment of status operates as cessation, but without
any examination on the grounds set out in Article 1C. Id.
82 See INA § 209(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (West 2003). The statute merely provides that
after inspection or hearing, if found admissible, an immigrant under the Act will be
regarded as lawfully admitted for permanent residence as of the date of such alien's
arrival into the United States. Id.; see Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 17 n. 14. However,
once the refugee adjusts his status to Lawful Permanent Resident, he no longer possesses
legal status as a refugee. Id. Yet, he may remain eligible for certain social benefits
unavailable to other Lawful Permanent Residents, Id.; see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1613 (West 2003).
These benefits include Federal-means tested public benefits. Id.
2005] REFUGEES iN THE U.S.
"refugees" - is no longer necessary.8 3 LPR status does not
ensure protection from deportation, expulsion, or extradition.8 4
This vulnerability is especially relevant in the context of the 1996
Act, 85 which substantially increased the number of crimes which
fall under the term "aggravated felony," and thus deemed many
more aliens deportable. 86
As stated earlier, in order for a refugee to remain legally in the
U.S., he or she must become a Lawful Permanent Resident.8 7 If
an individual was to lose her refugee status upon becoming an
LPR, she would become subject to removal according to Section
237 of the INA, titled "deportable aliens."88  Given the
commitment of the United States to uphold the provisions of the
1967 Protocol (which is inherently a commitment to protect
persons deemed to credibly fear return to the native countries)
placing recognized refugees in the same category as otherwise
83 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 426 (stating that while there are
many benefits to LPR status, it is not equivalent to citizenship). See generally William
McKay Bennett, Reentering the Golden Door: Waiving Goodbye to Exclusion Grounds for
Permanent Resident Aliens, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1994) (suggesting that even
permanent resident aliens who are not deportable can leave the country and be excluded
at the border upon return); Martin, supra note 76, at 48 (noting that LPR's are not
immune from deportation).
84 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 426 (explaining that for purposes of
cessation of refugee status, this distinction is critical); see also Laurie A. Levin,
Deportation: Procedural Rights of Reentering Permanent Resident Aliens Subjected to
Exclusion Hearings, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1340-41 (1983) (noting that despite
constitutional protections of permanent residents, they are still subject to INS
deportation). See generally INA § 335, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225 (West 2004) (providing methods
for which inadmissible aliens are expedited).
85 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
86 See Ulin, supra note 54, at 1556 (explaining that the Act reduced both monetary
thresholds and sentencing requirements of enumerated "aggravated felonies" and other
offenses); see also Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INVL LAW. 471
(1998) (suggesting that now almost any felony may be considered an aggravated felony
resulting in deportation); Coonan, supra note 49, at 602-4 (noting that alien smuggling
has become an aggravated felony except for first-timers who attempt to smuggle specific
members of their family).
87 See INA § 209(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159 (West 2003). This occurs at the end of one
year, when the refugee returns to the custody of INS for inspection and examination for
admission as an immigrant. Id. Thereafter, if they are determined to be admissible, they
are to be regarded as an immigrant lawfully admitted. Id.; see also Nora V. Demleitner,
The Fallacy of Social "Citizenship," or the Threat of Exclusion, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 35,
41-42 (1997). Although these immigrants are lawfully admitted, the distinction between
an illegal alien and a lawful permanent resident from the perspective of American citizens
has eroded over time. Id.; see Capt. George L. Hancock, Jr., Legal Assistance and the 1986
Amendments to the Immigration, Nationality, and Citizenship Law, 1987 ARMY LAW. 11,
13 (1987). Permanent resident aliens, however, can live in the United States forever
without becoming full citizens, as long as they are not deported. Id.
88 See INA § 237, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 (West 2003) (describing general classes of aliens
Attorney General may deport).
218 ST JOHN'S JOUP NAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:1
deportable aliens is clearly erroneous.8 9 Since the adjustment to
LPR status is mandatory within one year of being deemed a
refugee in order to remain in the US legally as outlined in INA
§209, and because LPRs are obviously not afforded the same
privileges and protections as U.S. citizens, the granting of
adjustment of status cannot be considered to fit in any of the
cessation clauses in the Protocol.
The risk of deportation to LPRs is most evident in Section
237(a)(2), titled "Criminal Offenses" which includes, among other
offenses, aggravated felonies: "any alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." 90
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198891 introduced the concept of an
"aggravated felony" and made the commission of such crimes
grounds for deportation. 92 Since the term "aggravated felony"
first became a familiar term in Immigration Law, it has come to
encompass crimes ranging from those listed in section
101(a)(43)(A), "murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor,"93 to
those listed in 101(a)(43)(G), "a theft offense (including receipt of
stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of
imprisonment at least one year [sic]."94 For a person convicted of
a minor crime, the effects are obviously devastating. 95 To a
89 See Hathaway, supra note 18, at 159 (stating that once authorized "in law or in
fact to remain in an asylum state, refugees are further entitled to claim the rights that
apply to refugees who are lawfully within the territory of a state party"); see also
Gwendolyn M. Holinka, Q-T-M.T" The Denial of Humanitarian Relief for Aggravated
Felons, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 405, 407-08 (1999) (noting that 1996 Act has jeopardized
United States' compliance with its international obligations under 1967 Protocol). See
generally Heather A. Leary, Immigration Project: The Nature of Global Commitments and
Obligations: Limits on State Sovereignty in the Area of Asylum, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG.
STUD. 297, 299-300 (1997) (providing 1967 Protocol's definition of refugee).
90 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2004).
91 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70
(1988) (defining aggravated felony and its application for enforcement).
92 See id.; see also 8 U.S.C.S. § 7344 (including aggravated felony convictions as
grounds for deportation); Bennett, supra note 8, at 1696-99 (detailing aggravated felony
provisions and their implications in light of Constitution's Naturalization Clause);
Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
293, 298 (2003) (noting wide range of crimes encompassed by aggravated felony provision
and how such range has only further expanded upon enactment of Anti-Drug Abuse Act).
93 INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (West 2004).
94 INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 1101(a)(43)(G) (West 2004).
95 See Cook, supra note 92, at 298 (recognizing consequences of offenses under
aggravated felony provision are incredibly harsh, but that such crimes "need neither be
'felonies' nor 'aggravated' in the commonly understood sense of the words"); Robert James
McWhirter, Hell Just Got Hotter: The Rings of Immigration Hell and the Immigration
Consequences to Aliens Convicted of Crimes Revisited, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 512-13
(1997) (indicating that even mere addiction to any narcotic is grounds for deportation);
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person granted LPR status on any grounds these consequences
are escalated due to increased family ties, length of time in the
U.S. and established lives in the United States. 96 Furthermore,
to apply this provision to a recognized refugee who has fled his
home country for fear of persecution, reestablished himself in the
U.S., and adjusted successfully to LPR status, the consequences
are magnified.97 Hence, the UNHCR's contention that LPR
status does not afford the same protections as required to invoke
cessation clause 1(C)(3) is obvious. 98
Cancellation of Refugee Status, on the other hand, requires
circumstances that demonstrate a person should have never been
granted such status in the first place and may lead to a
revocation of the status.99 This has the effect of rendering refugee
status "null and void from the date of initial determination."100
This is distinguished from cessation of refugee status pursuant to
Article 1(C) of the 1951 Convention, which revokes refugee status
Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1940-41 (2000) (noting that
individuals with two drug possession convictions may be treated as aggravated felons
even if such convictions are considered misdemeanors under state law).
96 See Cook, supra note 92, at 302-03 (stating that in cases of LPR's, deportation is
similar to banishment from one's home country); Coonan, supra note 49, at 612
(commenting that equities accrued by LPR's, such as years of residence, steady work
records, families members who are United States citizens, and strong military records
mean nothing when considered aggravated felons facing deportation); Morawetz, supra
note 95, at 1940 (conveying situation of LPR who lived in United States for thirty-nine
years and faced mandatory deportation for seemingly minor conviction).
97 See Kari Converse, Criminal Law Reforms: Defending Immigrants in Peril, 21
CHAMPION 10, *12 (1997) (explaining that refugees removed to their home country due to
aggravated felony conviction could result in death). See generally Hathaway, supra note
18, at 164 (discussing "basic dignity" that international law attempts to restore by
requiring respect for rights of non-discrimination, family unity, freedom of movement and
association, and freedom of religion); Michael J. Parrish, Redefining the Refugee: The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a Basis for Refugee Protection, 22 CARDoZO L.
REV. 223, 258 (2000) (commenting that refugees should obtain right to asylum where, in
contrast to home nation, human rights will be upheld by states receiving them).
98 See Handbook, supra note 30, at 116 (detailing that explicit reasons must exist to
justify removal of refugee status); UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 426 (stating
that such approach is significant since constant review of refugee status is improper); see
also Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 1,
15 (1997) (observing that United States citizens differ from LPR's in that LPR's are
subject to deportation while citizens are not).
99 See Handbook, supra note 30, at 117 (stating that "[c]ircumstances may ... come
to light that indicate that a person should never have been recognized as a refugee in the
first place .... ); UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 429 (explaining assessment of
cancellation to refugee status); see also Kapferer, supra note 67, at 2 (stating that such
cancellation situations apply to final determinations neither subject to appeal nor review).
100 Kapferer, supra note 67, at 2 (noting further that persons not eligible for
protection at time they were recognized cannot claim to be prejudiced by cancellation of
status that ought not to have been granted).
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because it is either no longer justified or necessary due to
voluntary acts by the refugee,101 or because there has been a
"fundamental change in the situation prevailing in the country of
origin."10 2 Most important with regards to cancellation is that
those persons who were rightly recognized as having an actual
well-founded fear of persecution under the 1951 Convention
"must be protected from cancellation of their refugee status in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner."103 In order for an
administrative act to justify cancellation of refugee status, one of
several specific grounds must be present. These include: (1)
substantial fraud on the part of the applicant with regard to core
aspects relating to his or her eligibility for protection; (2) other
misconduct affecting eligibility, such as threats or bribery; (3)
applicability of an exclusion clause104 with or without fraud on
the part of the applicant; or (4) an error of law and/or fact by the
determining authority, relating to inclusion or exclusion
criteria.105 The termination provision of Section 207 of the INA
falls into the category of cancellation.106 Obviously, becoming a
LPR is not included in the list of cancellation circumstances
because it does not constitute a discovery of fraud or misconduct
in the refugee status determination. Cancellation of a refugee
101 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 425 (reviewing cessation clauses of
Article I(C) and how certain clauses reflect changes brought about by refugees themselves
or by change in country where persecution was possible); Fitzpatrick, supra note 75, at
348-49 (explaining two types of developments under cessation clauses); Kapferer, supra
note 67, at 2 (detailing cessation clauses of Article I(C) resulting 1951 Convention).
102 Kapferer, supra note 67, at 2.
103 Id. (noting that State cannot simply cancel refugee status whenever initial
determination of such status is deemed flawed).
104 See Handbook, supra note 30, at 117 (indicating that fraud by applicant can
justify cancellation of refugee status); UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 429
(listing circumstances that may require exception to res judicata in cancellation
determination); see also Kapferer, supra note 67, at 5 (observing that cancellation
basically is re-assessment of eligibility for refugee protection "at the time of the original
determination .... ).
105 See Kapferer, supra note 67, at 4-5 (listing variety of reasons administrative
decision might be faulty); see also UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 429 (naming
three circumstances that are exceptions to final status determination). See generally
Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that, per Convention, 6
events can lead to cancellation of "refugee" status).
106 INA § 207, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1157(c)(4) (West 2004) (stating that refugee status of any
alien may be terminated by Attorney General if he determines that the alien was not in
fact a refugee); see also Simonovskiy v. Ashcroft, 71 Fed.Appx. 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting party's argument that he was still a refugee because immigration judge lacked
authority to conduct removal proceedings and there had been no cancellation of his status
under §207 of the INA); see also Kapferer, supra note 67, at 13 (discussing cancellation of
refugee status because of mistakes on the part of authorities).
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status determination that has become final "will be justified only
if the original determination was wrongly made."107
II. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH
After reviewing the international laws that must be followed
by the U.S. in accordance with its accession to the 1967 Protocol,
it is necessary to review how the United States has approached
the refugee dilemma in its own laws and regulations. From this,
US case law suggests that US immigration courts have no
authority to deport a person who entered as a refugee and
adjusted to LPR status without first terminating the refugee
status.lOS However, changes to the Immigration and Nationality
Act over the last several years have complicated matters and
made it more difficult for immigrants to remain in the U.S.109 In
1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA")11o, which in
conjunction with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),111 expanded the criminal grounds of
deportation and restricted the availability of discretionary relief
to non-citizens in removal proceedings. 112 For example, once an
107 See Kapferer, supra note 67, at 5-6. The author notes that, in the United States,
cancellation on the basis of fraud on the part of the applicant is seen as discretionary. Id.
108 See Smriko, 387 F.3d at 284 (noting UN High Commissioner's position that
acquiring LPR status is no basis for cessation of refugee status); see also UNHCR Opinion
Letter, supra note 58, at 423 (stating that refugee status is not usurped by acquisition of
LPR status). But see In re Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381, 1382 n.2 (2000) (suggesting that
"former" refugee status of a LPR is no basis for canceling removal proceedings.)
109 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001) (noting that recent statutes
effectively reduce number of aliens who are granted relief); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The
Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the
Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L. J.
833, 839 (1997) (discussing 'draconian' provisions of Antiterrorism Act which
consequently affected far more people than expressly intended); Michele R. Pistone &
Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J.
1, 1-2 (2001) (discussing "harsh" immigration control measures that tend to cause undue
hardship on the most deserving of immigrants; those that have a well-founded fear of
persecution in their home country).
110 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
111 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
112 E.g. U.S. v. Galvan-Munoz, 44 Fed.Appx. 875, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2002); see INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001). As the court in St. Cyr, stated:
Three statutes enacted in recent years have reduced the size of the class of aliens
eligible for such discretionary relief. In 1990, Congress amended § 212(c) to preclude
from discretionary relief anyone convicted of an aggravated felony who had served a
term of imprisonment of at least five years. § 511, 104 Stat. 5052 (amending 8 U.S.C.
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alien is deemed an "aggravated felon," s/he becomes ineligible to
apply for asylum, adjustment of status, voluntary departure, and
cancellation of removal.113
A. Defining Refugees and Providing Asylum
After World War II, admissions of persons as refugees changed
several times, mainly because Congress struggled to find a
balance between establishing a clear method of determining and
regulating refugee status, and allowing flexibility to respond to
new crises.11 4 The Refugee Act of 1980 ("1980 Act")1' 5 created "a
relatively stable framework for accommodating these...
ends."116  The 1980 Act adopts most of the 1967 Protocol
definition, which today is codified in the Immigration and
Nationality Act.117 The INA extends the term refugee to "any
§ 1182(c)). In 1996, in § 440(d) of AEDPA, Congress identified a broad set of offenses
for which convictions would preclude such relief. See 110 Stat. 1277 (amending 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c)). And finally, that same year, Congress passed IIRIRA. That statute,
inter alia, repealed § 212(c), see § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597, and replaced it with a
new section that gives the Attorney General the authority to cancel removal for a
narrow class of inadmissible or deportable aliens, see id. at 3009-594 (creating 8
U.S.C. § 1229b). So narrowed, that class does not include anyone previously
"convicted of any aggravated felony." § 1229b(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
Id. at 297. While the IIRIRA expanded the definition of "aggravated felony" to include a
"theft" offense, the AEDPA similarly enlarged the category of criminal convictions that
would prohibit an alien from seeking relief from deportation. Id.; Ryan Moore,
Reinterpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act's Categorical Bar to Discretionary
Relief for 'Aggravated Felons" in Light of International Law: Extending Beharry v. Reno,
21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 535, 537 (2004). Given the expansive definition of
"aggravated felon" in the Act, and the lack of relief available to such persons, the
consideration of a person's refugee status becomes critical. An aggravated felony pursuant
to the INA can encompass crimes that are under criminal standards "misdemeanors" as a
crime of violence. Id.
113 See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b)(a)(3) (West 2000) (excluding aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies from cancellation of removal); see also INA § 240A, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1229(c)(a)(1) (West 2000) (excluding aggravated felons from applying for
voluntary departure); INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2000) (stating that,
for the purpose of asylum laws, aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony
shall be considered to have been convicted of a "particularly serious crime," rendering
them ineligible for asylum).
114 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 795. Today, there exist several forms of
protection to persons fleeing persecution: asylum, withholding of removal, refugee status,
and Torture Convention relief. Id.; see ANKER, supra note 37, at 2. Asylum status,
withholding of removal, and refugee status are all based on provisions from the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol ratified by the US in 1968. Id. Immigration laws are
typically employed to respond to domestic threats. Johnson, supra note 109, at 834-35.
115 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
116 ALEINIKOFF ETAL., supra note 1, at 795.
117 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2000). The Refugee Act of 1980
adopted the obligation of protection against return, or non-refoulement that formed the
basis of statutory withholding of removal protection in INA §241(b)(3), which restricts
removal to a country where a non-citizen's life or freedom would be threatened. Id.; see
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person" outside a country of nationality or one habitually resided
in, who is "unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion."118 In the second
part of the definition, the President is given authority to specify
persons within their country of nationality or habitual residence
as eligible for refugee status - in other words, before fleeing the
persecuting circumstances.1 1 9 The language of the statute is
therefore pertinent to both overseas refugee programs, and the
political asylum system that exists within U.S. borders.120 In
fact, the refugee definition as adopted in the 1980 Act serves as
prima facie eligibility for asylum in the U.S.121
Section 207 of the INA governs the annual admission of
refugees and admission of emergency situation refugees.122 It
also explains when refugee status may terminate:
ANKER, supra note 37, at 3-4. One of the primary congressional purposes behind the 1980
Act was to align it with the Convention. Id.; see Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1061 (3d
Cir. 1997). The court noted the Congressional intent to harmonize the 1980 Act with the
Protocol. Id. For example, Congress specifically defined "refugee" in accordance with the
Protocol. Id.
118 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2000).
119 INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (West 2000); (granting President
discretionary authority in accordance with the Act). See generally Pollgreen v. Morris, 770
F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing Presidential determination that applied to
Cuban refugees); Dominguez v. DeMore, 2001 WL 92346, at *1 (D. Ore. 2001) (noting
President Carter's application of INA § 101(a)(42)(A) to Cubans in Peruvian Embassy).
120 See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C.A. §1158 (West 2003) (stating alien may be granted
asylum if he is found to be a refugee as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); ALEINIKOFF
ET AL. supra note 1, at 789 (discussing political asylum in United States). See generally,
Melanie Allen, Legislative Reform: Changes to the Lautenberg Amendment May Even the
Score for Asylees, 27 J. LEGIS. 215, 218 (2001) (noting that INA directs the President, after
congressional consultation, to designate number of refugees to be admitted into United
States each year).
121 INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a) (West 2003) (noting that any alien that is
physically present on United States soil may apply for asylum status); see Steinbock,
supra note 32, at 735 (discussing 1951 Convention and refugee definition as pertinent in
U.S. asylum law). See generally Peter Marguiles, Democratic Transitions and the Future
of Asylum Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3, (2000) (discussing decline in protection of refugees
by United States resulting from developing case law and federal regulations).
122 INA § 207, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1157 (West 2003) (delineating number of refugees
permitted annually, criteria of admission for refugees, their spouses and children, and
criteria for termination of refugee status); see ANKER, supra note 37, at 4 (noting under
U.S. law that "refugee status" is only available to persons applying from outside U.S.,
whereas asylum status is available to persons seeking protection in U.S., or at its borders,
and is not subject to numerical limits); see also Parrish, supra note 97, at 223 (noting that
United States identifies refugees as suffering from persecution due to five identified
categories: "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion").
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The refugee status of any alien (and of the spouse or child of
the alien) may be terminated by the Attorney General
pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may
prescribe if the Attorney General determines that the alien
was not in fact a refugee within the meaning of section
101(a)(42) at the time of the aliens admission.12 3
The required termination of refugee status, before deportation
is permitted, was addressed by the Board of Immigration Appeals
in Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray.124 This case involved a 39-year-
old native and citizen of Cuba, who was admitted to the United
States pursuant to section 207.125 The refugee was convicted in
Texas on January 31, 1981 of burglary, and was sentenced to
three years in prison.126 He was placed in exclusion proceedings,
which were later terminated by the Immigration Judge on the
grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction.127 The Board
affirmed the termination, stating there was no evidence showing
that his status as a refugee was terminated in accordance with
the Act and regulations,128 and noted that section 207 is the sole
basis of terminating the status.129 Clearly, to state that refugee
status terminates upon becoming an LPR is contrary to any
statutory provision found in the INA. Unfortunately, the Board
of Immigration Appeals has not been consistent in applying the
principles outlined in Garcia-Alzugaray.130
123 INA § 207(c)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1157 (West 2004).
124 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I. & N. Dec. 407, 409-10 (BIA 1986) (noting that
proper termination of refugee status must occur before commencement of exclusion
proceedings).
125 Id. at 407 (using § 207 as it then existed).
126 Id. (noting that imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed
on probation).
127 Id. at 408 (noting that termination proceedings were properly ceased but tribunal
disagreed with lower immigration judge's reasoning).
128 Id. at 409 (noting that termination of his status was deficient as to notice, which
was "factually inaccurate and legally deficient"); see 8 C.F.R. § 209.1 (1986) (noting that
compliance with provisions of this section are the sole method to adjust basis of refugee
status); 8 C.F.R. § 207.9 (1986) (providing that an alien must be found to be a refugee at
his time of admission).
129 Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 409 (explaining that refugee's
status may be terminated if there is a finding that he was not a refugee at time of his
admission into the country); see 8 C.F.R. § 207.8 (1986) (stating necessary steps to
terminate refugee's status); 8 C.F.R. §209.1 (1986) (stating that "[t]he provisions of this
section shall provide the sole and exclusive procedure for adjustment of status by a
refugee admitted under section 207 of the Act whose application is based on his or her
refugee status").
130 See Matter of U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327, 333 (BIA 1991) (stating that prosecuting
authority has complete authority to decide whether to commence deportation
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B. Arguments Against Required Termination
In Matter of Awat Mengisteab Bahta,131 the Board sustained
an appeal by the INS from the Immigration Judge's decision,
which found that the respondent's conviction for attempted
possession of stolen property was not a conviction for an
aggravated felony and terminated removal proceedings.132 While
the main issue on appeal revolved around whether the
respondents conviction fit within the definition of an aggravated
felony in 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, the opinion highlights the
Board's overall attitude regarding the required termination of a
refugees status before subjecting them to deportation.133 The IJ
below had found that the respondent's conviction was not an
aggravated felony as defined in the Act, and terminated
proceedings.134  However, in a brief footnote, the Board
recognized that:
The Immigration Judge also terminated the proceedings on
the ground that the Service failed to demonstrate that the
respondent's refugee status has been terminated after notice
and hearing. The record indicates, however, that the
respondent adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent
resident on November 4, 1982. The respondent's former
status as a refugee, therefore, does not provide a basis for
terminating the proceedings.135
This brief recognition and dismissal of respondent's refugee
status provides a clear demonstration of the attitude being taken
toward this issue. It also demonstrates the lack of reasoning or
consideration given to explain why the Board believes that
adjusting to LPR status erases the protections afforded to
refugees.
proceedings). See generally Matter of Awat Mengisteab Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381 (BIA
2000) (explaining that prosecutorial discretion is paramount in cases such as this).
131 Matter of Awat Mengisteab Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381 (BIA 2000).
132 Id. at 1382 (outlining reason for Board review).
133 Id. at 1391-92 (discussing the availability of prosecutorial discretion of the I.N.S.
to consider the equities of individual cases in pursuing removal cases, as an avenue to
combat the expansive classification of criminal aliens for whom no statutory relief is
available).
134 Id. at 1381 (noting that appeal ruling of Immigration and Naturalization Judge's
decision, from July 1, 1999, found that respondent's conviction for attempted possession of
stolen property was not an aggravated felony).
135 Id. at 1382 n.2.
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Interestingly, the Board also discussed the issue of
"prosecutorial discretion," and the fact that the INS has the
discretion to decide whether or not to institute deportation or
removal proceedings.1 36 It pointed out that the INS may "address
the equities of individual cases" in a way that applying the broad
statutes may not allow.137 The Board also stated that the Service
retained this discretion even after the enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA").138 In answer to Congressional questioning as to the
existence of prosecutorial discretion after IIRIRA, the Attorney
General's Office responded "the exercise of such discretion can be
the only means for averting the extreme hardship associated
with certain removal cases."139 However, this hardly provides an
alien with an adequate means of protection. As recognized by the
Board, neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board may review
a decision by the Service to institute removal proceedings. 140
What this amounts to is an almost complete lack of review as to
whether removal proceedings were justly instituted. In
conjunction with the extremely broad (and expanding) definition
of "aggravated felony", this leads to tragic consequences. 141
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Bahta's factual background is
discussed.142 Mr. Bahta was admitted to the U.S. as a refugee
136 Matter of Awat Mengisteab Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1391 (explaining that
Respondent did not raise prosecutorial discretion, but reiterating anyway that discretion
exists).
137 Id. at 1391 (stating that "the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the Service's continuing prosecutorial discretion").
138 Id. (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), 104 P.L. 208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) and noting how IIRIRA expanded
classifications of criminal aliens for whom no statutory relief exists).
139 Id. at 1392 (illuminating that discretion must exist because IIRIRA does not
necessarily protect all criminal aliens from removal).
140 See id. at 1391; Matter of U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327, 333 (BIA 1991) (noting that
"the decision to institute deportation proceedings involves the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and is one which neither the immigration judge nor this Board reviews");
Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 589 (BIA 1978) (stating that decision to institute
deportation proceedings is "[v]ested in the discretion of the District Director").
141 See Flo Messier, Alien Defendants in Criminal Proceedings: Justice Shrugs, 36
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1414 (1999) (noting that small crimes can also be categorized as
deportable aggravated felonies); see also Julie Anne Rah, The Removal of Aliens Who
Drink and Drive: Felony DWI as a Crime of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 2109, 2118 (2002) (stating that IIRIRA greatly expands number of
aliens that are deportable for commission of aggravated felonies); Jennifer Welsh,
Defending Against Deportation: Equipping Public Defenders to Represent Noncitizens
Effectively, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 548-49 (2004) (explaining that 'aggravated felony'
encompasses both state and federal convictions).
142 Matter of Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1393 (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting).
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when he was four years old, and had been a LPR since 1982.143
Fifteen years later, in 1997, he was found guilty of "willfully,
unlawfully..., for his own gain, [to] possess property... [he]
knew, or had reason to believe, had been stolen."144 As stated
earlier, no action was taken by the Service to terminate his
refugee status. In effect, that status and its protections were
ignored, solely because of his adjustment to LPR status-a
mandatory action for every refugee.145
In January of 2003, the Board in Matter of J- L-Y-F - 146 rejected
the respondent's argument that his refugee status could only be
terminated in accordance with Section 207.147 Stating only that
the validity of respondent's refugee status at the time of entrance
was not at issue, the Board saw "no merit to the respondent's
argument that his refugee status must first be terminated before
the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction to conduct a removal
hearing" and that the record showed the INS "changed" the
respondent's refugee status when he was granted adjustment to
that of a Lawful Permanent resident.148 Again, there is no
statutory basis for this conclusion, and when interpreting the
INA in conjunction with the provisions of the 1967 Protocol, there
is clearly no validity to the statement that refugee status
terminates upon adjustment.149
143 Id. at 1319.
144 Id. at 1393 (stating that criminal case was ended by plea bargain).
145 See INA § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2004) (stating procedure for adjusting refugee
status); J. Michael Cavosie, Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and
Ideological Decision Making in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 IND. L. J. 411, 437 (1992) (stating
that refugees obtain LPR status "virtually as a matter of course"); Michael G. Heyman,
Immigration Law in the Supreme Court: The Flagging Spirit of the Law, 28 J. LEGIS. 113,
125-26 (2002) (noting that refugees may become LPR's after one year as long as they
remain eligible for refugee status).
146 Respondent's Motion to Reopen Proceedings, Matter of J- L-V- F- (BIA Jan. 6,
2003) (No. A19-627-851) [Hereinafter "Respondent's Motion"] (denying respondent's
motion to reopen).
147 Respondent's Motion, supra note 146, at 1. The respondent sought to reopen
proceedings in order to seek relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Id. Besides arguing that his
refugee status had not terminated, the Respondent argued he was a national of the
United States. Id.
148 Respondent's Motion, supra note 146, at 1. The Board directly pointed to the sole
provision within the INA that would allow termination, 8 C.F.R. § 207.9 (2002). Id. The
Board claimed that the termination provision only applied to those persons who are found
to have not been refugees at the time of entrance, instead of reading the provision as
meaning the only way of terminating is if the refugee's initial granting of the status was
faulty. Id.
149 INA § 209(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2) (2004). The adjustment statute does not
state whether refugee status is terminated upon adjustment to LPR status, only that the
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C. How Many Immigrants are Effected By This Problem?
The above cases are demonstrative of cases in which the
termination issue was directly addressed. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to precisely determine how many individuals who
entered as refugees and adjusted to LPR status are deported
each year without having had their LPR status terminated. 150
However, it is arguable that any person who entered as a
refugee, adjusted to lawful permanent resident status, and was
later convicted of a crime subjecting them to removal proceedings
is highly disadvantaged when the government simply assumes
the refugee status is no longer relevant. For example, Matter of
H-M-V-151 involved a native and citizen of Iran, who entered the
United States in 1985 as a refugee.152 Five years later, the
respondent was convicted in U.S. District Court, Central District
of California, of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
heroin and possession with intent to distribute heroin.153 He was
sentenced to 95 months in prison, which was later reduced to 70
months. 154 In 1994, respondent was issued an Order to Show
Cause and Notice of Hearing charging him with deportability
under 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA as an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony.155 After respondent's application for relief was
refugee is admitted to the United States on a permanent resident basis. Id. In fact, there
are very precise circumstances under which refugee status may be revoked, none of which
include adjustment. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24 (2004); see also Rebecca Kidder, Administrative
Discretion Gone Awry: The Reintroduction of the Public Charge Exclusion for HIV-Positive
Refugees and Asylees, 106 YALE L. J. 389, 417 (1996). The statutes are also at times
unclear as to when asylum status may be revoked. Id. In fact, revocation is only allowed
in limited circumstances directly related to a refugee's current or former asylum status.
Id.
150 See Mark Figueiredo, Immigration Law: Butros v. INS: The Folly of Finality as
an Absolute Bar to Seeking Section 212(c) Relief from Deportation, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 607, 641 (1994) (explaining that an alien's LPR status can "unwisely" remain valid
after the alien is deported, making it difficult to ascertain an exact percentage); David A.
Martin, On Counterintuitive Consequences and Choosing the Right Control Group: A
Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 363, 381 (2000) (noting that percentage of
criminal aliens deported that are LPR's is unknown, but is probably around 25 per cent).
See generally Susan Sachs, The Nation: Second Thoughts; Cracking the Door for
Immigrants, N.Y. TrMES, July 1, 2001, at p. 3 (discussing that LPR status is no longer
secure).
151 Matter of H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256 (BIA 1998).
152 Id. at 257.
153 Id. (stating respondent was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(a)(1) and §
846).
154 Id.
155 Id. As an application for relief, the respondent applied for the then available
"Section 212(c) relief," 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). Id. This relief was denied because
respondent had served in excess of five years imprisonment. Id.
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denied by the Immigration Judge, an appeal was taken to the
Board of Imigation Appeals, which was also denied.156 In a
motion to reopen the case to the Board, the respondent argued in
part that the 1968 Protocol required an individual determination
of whether the respondent represented a "danger to the
community."157 The Board held that he was not deserving of an
individual determination prior to finding him ineligible for
withholding of deportation.158 In a dissent by another Board
member, the essence of what should be considered in the case of
a refugee or a person seeking relief pursuant to the UN
Convention Against Torture is discussed: "the prohibited conduct
- be it persecution or torture - must be assessed; the
assessment is made based on the consideration of evidence
pertaining to the individual's personal circumstances and the
treatment he or she has experienced or fears . . "159 Such
considerations should be made in all cases involving refugees, in
varying contexts. 160
156 Matter of H.M.V., 747 A.2d 425 (Pa. Sup. Ct., 1999).
157 Matter of H-M-V-,22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 257 (BIA 1998). The respondent's other
application for relief was pursuant to Article 3 of the Torture Convention, which prohibits
the return of an individual to a country where there are "substantial grounds of believing
that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Id. The Board, in its
decision, rejected this claim by the respondent, stating that there had not been any
specific implementing legislation of Article 3. Id.
158 Id. at 260. Here, the respondent was barred from applying for withholding of
deportation because that relief is only available to those aliens who have been sentenced
to an aggregate of less than five years in prison and the Attorney General determines, in
his discretion, that the alien's crime is not particularly serious. Id.
159 Id. at 279.
160 There are not many cases that actually discuss the termination issue. However,
there are numerous occasions on which the termination of refugee status, if required,
would protect a refugee from being unjustly returned to a country he feared. See e.g.
Setharatsomphou v. Ashcroft, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10211 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (unpublished
opinion). That case involved a refugee who entered in 1986 and became an LPR in 1987.
Id. at *3. He was convicted of aggravated assault in 1992 and was sentenced to three
years imprisonment. Id. The court dismissed Setharatsomphou's petition for a writ of
mandamus and habeas corpus relief because, although at the time of his conviction his
crime did not constitute an aggravated felony, the retroactive application of IIRIRA's new
definitions applying to 212(h) waivers precluded the relief. Id. at *7-8. United States ex
rel. Zhelyatdinov v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26531 (E.D. Pa. 2002) involved an
alien who entered the United States as a refugee from his native Kazakhstan. Id. at *1.
He became an LPR but was subject to a deportation order as a result of a conviction for
conspiracy to commit theft. Id. Zhelyatdinov claimed that the Immigration Judge erred in
finding that he was removable as an aggravated felon. Id. at*11. Due to the fact that he
was convicted of an aggravated felony, he was not eligible for asylum in the United
States. Id. at *12. Although his habeas corpus petition was ultimately granted, and he
was eligible for CAT relief, had a termination of refugee status hearing been required, he
may not have been forced to litigate up to the District Court. Id. at *1. In Matter of Phat
Dinh Truong, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1090 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals
dismissed the appeal of a refugee from Vietnam who adjusted to LPR status, holding him
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Furthermore, the INA provides, in Section 209, that any alien
who has been admitted to the United State as a refugee, and has
been present in the United States for at least one year, must be
presented to Immigration officials for inspection and examination
for admission as an immigrant.161 In other words, those persons
deemed refugees, and offered such protection, are subject to
mandatory adjustment of status in order to remain legally within
the United States.162 Nowhere in the provisions governing
adjustment of status of refugees does it state that the refugee
status terminates. 163 Additionally, the discretionary provision of
Section 209(c) allowing the Attorney General to waive almost all
of the inadmissibility grounds on the basis of humanitarian,
family unity, or public interest grounds confirms the commitment
of the legislature in preserving the protective purpose of refugee
status.164 This discretionary provision should be utilized by the
Immigration Courts when an LPR entered as a refugee is placed
before them in removal proceedings.
In context of the issue at hand, if the U.S. refuses to recognize
the weight of international agreements, and incorrectly
interprets the INA to mean refugee status terminates upon being
granted lawful permanent residence, as early as one year after
ineligible for relief after being sentenced to six years confinement, and applying IIRIRA's
aggravated felony definition to his case. Id. at 1098. Finally, in Matter of Phon Nguyen
Tran, 21 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 1996), the Board of Immigration Appeals sustained an
appeal by the INS, contesting an Immigration Judge's termination of deportation
proceedings of Respondent, who was convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. Id. at
291. Respondent had entered the U.S. as a refugee and adjusted to LPR status several
years before being convicted. Id.
161 INA § 209(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159(a)-(c).
162 INA § 209(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159(a)(2). INA § 209(a)(2) states that
Any alien who is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer
pursuant to paragraph (1) or after a hearing before an immigration officer pursuant
to paragraph (1) or after a hearing before an immigration judge to be admissible
(except as otherwise provided under subsection (c)) as an immigrant under this Act at
the time of the alien's inspection and examination shall, notwithstanding any
numerical limitation specified in this Act, be regarded as lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence as of the date of such alien's arrival into the
United States.
Id.; see e.g. Gorza v. INS, 30 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 1994). See generally Smriko v.
Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2004). The court has determined that one who
"has not had his refugee status terminated ... under INA § 207, 8 U.S.C.S § 1157, and
who has not been determined to be inadmissible following his examination by an
immigration officer under INA § 209(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159(a)(1), is not properly placed
in exclusion proceedings." Id.
163 See INA § 209, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159.
164 See INA §209(c), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159(c) (stating in relevant part: "[t]he Attorney
General may waive any other provision of such section... with respect to such an alien for
humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is in the public interest").
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fleeing their country of nationality, a refugee could be deported
back to the place that they were found to have a well-founded
fear of persecution. 165 This is clearly inconsistent with the 1951
Convention and Protocol as discussed above. As stated by the
UNHCR, refugee status can co-exist with other forms of
immigration status. 166 In the United States, several years of
lawful permanent residence is required before naturalizing. 167 In
the interim, a refugee should be protected according to the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol, maintaining refugee status until
he or she fully enjoys the benefits and protections of
citizenship. 168
D. The Supreme Court's View
The Supreme Court has several times commented on the
interpretation of the 1980 Act and the 1967 Protocol. 169 Overall,
165 See Ulin, supra note 54, at 1561 (questioning United States legislation and
policies which allow for deportation of aliens living in nation for years if they commit
small misdemeanor crime); see also INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427(a) (stating that a
person does not receive protection of U.S. naturalization until after five years, if s/he has
lived continuously in country and is of "good moral character"); Buckley, supra note 86, at
474-75 (noting change in U.S. policies and court decisions which deport refugees for
single conviction of crime of "moral turpitude").
166 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 426 (explaining protections nations
should afford refugees); see also INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (stating different
requirements for immigrants, refugees and naturalized persons than United Nations'
requirements). See generally Lauren Gilbert, The Impact of Reproductive Subordination
on Women's Health: Rights, Refugee Women & Reproductive Health, 44 AM. U.L. REV.
1213, 1220 (1995) (stating that "UNHCR seeks to ensure that those who qualify for
refugee status are granted asylum and legal status that takes into account their
particular situation and needs... and are treated in accordance with recognized
international standards").
167 See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (stating that generally, five years of residence is
required for naturalization, three years if an alien is married to U.S. citizen); see also
Buckley, supra note 86, at 473 (explaining that United States has increased its
requirements, including years of residence, for those seeking asylum and naturalizing);
Cook, supra note 92, at 294 (discussing burdens of refuge living in nation for many years
while being at risk for deportation).
168 See UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, App. at 426 (discussing importance of
maintaining refugee status until person becomes full-fledged citizen); see also Ulin, supra
note 54, at 1567-68 (explaining disparity of rights between citizens and refugees who can
be permanently removed from the country); Gilbert, supra note 166, at 1220-21 (stating
that Convention and Protocol are designed to ensure that refugees are afforded the "same
economic and social rights as nationals of the country in which they have been granted
asylum").
169 See Steinbock, supra note 32, at 743 (discussing four instances in which the
Supreme Court has addressed such refugee provisions in past fifteen years). See generally
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1999) (noting that Refugee Act was passed
to implement principals in agreement with 1967 Protocol); Joan Fitzpatrick, The
International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (1997) (noting
ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:1
the Court generally applies a plain meaning approach to
interpreting the INA's refugee provisions.170  This can be
problematic because it tends to undermine the overall purpose
behind having a refugee definition, and more specifically,
international agreements to which the U.S. is party.171 However,
reading the above provisions in the context of international
refugee law will both satisfy the explicit language of the Act, and
will comply with international standards.
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,172 the Supreme Court specifically
stated that:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new
definition of 'refugee' and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is
that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United
States refugee law into conformance with the [Protocol], to
which the United States acceded in 1968.173
The Court further pointed out that in the Conference Report,
which explains the various provisions adopted, states that in
regards to asylum and withholding of deportation, a House
provision was adopted "with the understanding that it is based
directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that
the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol."174
Inherent in the actual definition of the word "refugee" is the
application of those protective provisions that accompany it, such
as the limited circumstances where cessation or cancellation of
refugee status may occur. 175 In fact, the Court used the
that U.S. Supreme Court, though recognizing congressional intent for conformity with the
Protocol, declined to accept the Handbook as having the force of law).
170 See Steinbock, supra note 32, at 743 (declaring that U.S. Supreme Court has
applied plain meaning analysis to refugee laws and provisions); see also Fitzpatrick, supra
note 169, at 13 (stating that UNHCR Handbook is used to supplement the Court's
understanding when interpreting substantive Protocol provisions). But see Kahn, supra
note 6, at 60 (concluding that when interpreting INA's undefined statutory terms, courts
look to statute's legislative history).
171 See Steinbock, supra note 32, at 743 (concluding that plain meaning approach has
come to disregard 1967 Protocol's and Refugee Convention's provisions); see also Kahn,
supra note 6, at 60 (arguing that legislative history of Refugee Act suggests Congress
intended to adopt United Nation's definition of "refugee"); Pistone, supra note 109, at 4
(criticizing United States approach and interpretation of rules regarding refugees).
172 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (holding that "to show a
'well-founded fear of persecution,' an alien need not prove that it is more likely than not
that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home country").
173 Id. at 436-37.
174 Id. at 437 (citing S. Rep No. 96-590, p. 20 (1980)).
175 See Tarwater, supra note 74, at 565 (noting that, due to high stakes, UNHCR
encourages cessation clause to be interpreted in a restrictive way); see also Pistone, supra
232
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Committee reports statement regarding the Protocol to support
its own decision to construe the meaning of "well-founded fear" in
terms of the Protocol's provisions. 176 The Cardoza-Fonseca
Court's statement regarding the 1980 Refugee Act is extremely
important when considered in conjunction with the UNHCR's
position concerning the interpretation of the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol.177
The Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca further recognized
that "[d]eportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more
replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she
will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or
her home country." 178 When these statements are read along
with the requirements of the 1967 Protocol, it becomes clear that
not only is the United States obligated to comply with
international regulations concerning refugees, but the Supreme
Court has implicitly recognized this obligation.179 Even further,
Cardoza-Fonseca specifically recognized the importance of
UNHCR guidelines in interpreting the 1951 Convention and its
refugee definition, 8 0 and notes that the UNHCR's analysis is
note 109, at 3 (stressing importance of INS in protecting refugees, especially from being
deported). See generally Kahn, supra note 6, at 57-8 (arguing that determination of
definition and rights of refugees should be within legislative, and therefore not judicial,
branch).
176 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437 (using Conference Committee Report in
decision regarding Protocol's provisions); see James Hathaway & Anne Cusick, Refugee
Rights Are Not Negotiable, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 481, 523 (2000) (arguing that U.S.
Supreme Court has failed to take into account that the language of the Act's "well founded
fear" was drafted to comply with the Convention and not the reverse); see also Pistone,
supra note 109, at 8 (explaining American asylum law as necessitating very detailed
narrative to prove "well-founded fear" of prosecution).
177 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (discussing compliance with UNHCR); see
UNHCR Opinion Letter, supra note 58, at 426 (announcing United Nation's position on
protecting refugees in all nations); see also Pistone, supra note 109, at 7 (discussing the
incorporation into American law of 1967 Protocol through 1980 Refugee Act).
178 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987).
179 Id. at 453 (refusing to use legislative intent to bypass U.S.' obligations); see A.
Roman Boed, Past Persecution Standard for Asylum Eligibility in the Seventh Circuit:
Bygones are Bygones, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 147, 157 (1993) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court
has observed that the Protocol establishes "obligations"). See generally Moore, supra note
112, at 569 (arguing that U.S. regulations are limited by international law).
180 Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22 (stating that even though Handbook
explanations are not binding on the INS, it "provides significant guidance" in construing
the Protocol, and it is widely considered useful in giving context to obligations that the
Protocol establishes); see Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens
and Refugees under International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335, 2342 n.47
(1991) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court has cited the "Handbook" as a source of
'significant guidance' for adjudicators); Linda Dale Bevis, "Political Opinions" of Refugees:
Interpreting International Sources, 63 WASH L. REV 395, 399 (1988) (highlighting that
Handbook provides guidance in determining refugee status to governments, such as U.S.,
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consistent with the "origins of the Protocol definition."181 Though
the discussion in Cardoza-Fonseca does not directly address the
issue at hand (in that they do not discuss the termination of a
refugee's status) it is pertinent in that it recognizes the authority
of international agreements and Congress's intent to follow those
agreements in the context of refugees.182
III. IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS BY U.S. COURTS
There is clearly a divide in opinion as to the effects of
international agreements on domestic courts. 183 For example,
United States v. Aguilar184 found that the Protocol was not
intended to be self-executing. As such, it held that it does not
have the force of law and can only be used as a guide to Congress'
statutory intent in enacting the 1980 Refugee Act.185 This
that have signed onto Convention or Protocol and that although Handbook is not binding,
it is a persuasive guide).
181 Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 439; see Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences?
Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179, 1196
(1994) (stating that "given congressional intent to conform U.S. law to the 1967 Protocol,
the UNHCR's guidance is useful and relevant").
182 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 (1987); see Monroe Leigh, Immigration Law-
Asylum-Well-Founded Fear of Persecution, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 654, 655 (1987) (stating that
Court found that Congress intended to bring U.S. asylum practice into conformity with
U.N. Protocol); Shane M. Sorenson, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-
Fonesca: Two Steps in the Right Direction, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 95, 120 (1989) (suggesting that
Cardoza-Fonesca Court recognized that Congress intended Refugee Act to bring U.S. law
into compliance with the structure of U.N. Protocol).
183 See Matter of H-M-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 256, 259 (BIA 1998) (stating "several courts
have held that international treaty provisions generally do not attain the force of law
until the United States has enacted legislation or promulgated regulations to implement
such provisions"); see also Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law
in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 369 (1985) (arguing that under dualist
approach to international law, federal law will prevail when there is a conflict between
federal laws passed subsequent to adoption of conventional and customary international
law); Steven M. Karlson, International Human Rights Law: United States' Inmates and
Domestic Prisons, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 439, 443 (1996) (stating
that although the "Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of the land,
courts have developed a theory that, in the absence of implementing legislation, only self-
executing clauses in treaties are judicially enforceable in domestic courts").
184 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1046
(1991); see T. David Parish, Membership in a Particular Social Group under the Refugee
Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923,
924 n.8 (1992) (citing U.S. v. Aguilar for the assertion that the Protocol does not have
force of law because it is not self-executing).
185 Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 680; see T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Between National and Post-
National Membership in the United States, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 241, 249 (1999) (noting
that in order for a treaty to be enforceable in court it must be self-executing or Congress
must adopt legislation making the treaty applicable in U.S. courts).
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sentiment was mirrored in several other cases, however,
certiorari was denied, leaving the question unanswered by the
Supreme Court. 186
In contrast, in Beharry v. Reno187 Senior District Court Judge
Jack B. Weinstein emphasized the importance of U.S. Court's
honoring, recognizing, and upholding those agreements made
between nations. 188 The alien petitioner in this case was not a
refugee, he was a long time lawful permanent resident.s 9 He
was convicted of robbery in the second degree for an alleged theft
of $714 from a coffee shop cash register with the help of a friend
who worked at the shop. 190 Deportation proceedings followed
while petitioner was incarcerated.191 Under the INA, he did not
qualify for relief from removal because he was classified as an
aggravated felon.192 However, Judge Weinstein held that because
of treaty and international law requirements, the INA provisions
applied in this case should be interpreted to require that the
petitioner be granted a hearing, where he could show the effect of
his deportation on his family members, such as his U.S. citizen
daughter and sister, as well as his LPR wife. 193 Further, Judge
186 See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding provisions of
Protocol were not a source of right under our laws until Congress implemented them); see
also Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991) cert
denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992) (concluding that Article 33 of U.N. Protocol is not self
executing, thus providing no enforceable rights); Fitzpatrick, supra note 169, at 10
(arguing that U.S. Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether U.N. Protocol is self
executing, which has resulted in poorly reasoned decisions by lower courts).
187 Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) rev'd on other grounds, 329
F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003); see Laura S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship
between Domestic Immigration Law and International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983,
998 (2002) (calling decision of District Court a victory for immigration advocates and
international law).
188 Beharry, 183 F.Supp.2d at 591; Moore, supra note 112, at 542 (arguing that
Judge Weinstein rested his decision solely on international law grounds); Cook, supra
note 92, at 324 (discussing Judge Weinstein's use of international legal concepts in
overturning deportation order).
189 Beharry, 183 F.Supp. 2d at 586 (stating Petitioner entered U.S. at age 7 from
Trinidad with his family).
190 Id. at 586 (noting these facts were presented at his deportation hearing).
191 Id. at 586-87 (stating record was not clear as to whether force was used).
192 Id. at 587 (stating INS commenced deportation proceedings in February of 1997,
and in September 1997 he admitted deportability as an aggravated felon).
193 Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) rev'd on other grounds,
329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that hardships should be weighed against danger of
his remaining in U.S.).
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Weinstein held that treaties and international law overrode the
statutes and required a hearing anyway.194
Judge Weinstein touched upon the Treaty Power in his
argument, noting the Constitution explicitly states in Article VI;
sec. 2,195 that "the Untied States may enter into treaties under
the Constitution" and further that "all treaties made" by the
United States, along with federal law and the Constitution, are
the "supreme law of the land."196 Even non-ratified treaties are
often used as aids in statutory construction. 197
As stated previously, the United States acceded to the 1967
Protocol in 1968, and continues to formally recognize its
accession by participating in meetings and conventions
concerning the implementation and continued applicability of its
provisions. 198 Judge Weinstein reiterated in his opinion that "this
nation's credibility would be weakened by non-compliance with
194 Id. at 604-05; Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In 1997,
Judge Weinstein discussed the importance of complying with Human Rights Obligations
in the case Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In particular, he
discussed the right to stay of a lawfully present long-term resident alien. Id. He also
referenced the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which recognizes the length of residence in a country increases
the weight of an alien's right to stay. Id.; see Moore, supra note 112, at 540. Judge
Weinstein held that in order for U.S. law to conform to international law there must be a
waiver hearing. Mojica, 970 F.Supp. at 136-38.
195 U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2; see Beharry, 183 F.Supp.2d at 593 (noting roots of U.S.'
treaty power in Constitution).
196 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
197 See Beharry,183 F.Supp.2d at 593 (pointing out many cases in which non-ratified
treaties were used in statutory construction); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103,
1180 (1990) (distinguishing "preemptory from customary obligations" as a result of
doctrine of jus cogens, but noting that courts often have an obligation "to refrain from acts
that would defeat the object and the purpose of [that] treaty"). But see Moore, supra note
112, at 541 (noting uncertainty concerning application of international treaties to
domestic law).
198 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 32, at 23 n.1 (2003) (noting that United States was
one of 144 nations that were signatories to both 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol to the
Convention regarding status of refugees); see also Steinbock, supra note 32, at 735 (noting
that United States has adopted refugee definition in Protocol as the "basis of asylum
eligibility"). See generally Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 46, at 1
(stating that United States acceded to Protocol in 1968, and noting that nations subject to
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol are those that have acceded to Protocol).
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treaty obligations, or with international norms."199 Especially in
a time when the government of the U.S. is requesting
international support and compliance with international
measures to fight and combat terrorism, it is surely hypocritical
to ignore obligations which we have undertook to comply. Judge
Weinstein eloquently stated this reality:
The United States cannot expect to reap the benefits of
internationally recognized human rights- in the form of
greater worldwide stability and respect for people-without
being willing to adhere to them itself. As a moral leader of
the world, the United States has obligated itself not to
disregard rights uniformly recognized by other nations.200
Judge Weinstein also relied on international laws in the case
Mojica v. Reno201 which preceded Beharry. Here, in the context
of LPRs seeking discretionary relief from deportation according
to the former 212(c), Judge Weinstein discussed the history of
U.S. immigration law, and the international Human Rights
obligations of the United States. 202 Interestingly, he noted that
in the passage of the INA in 1965 in replacing the national
origins system, Lyndon B. Johnson declared that the INA:
Repairs a deep and painful flaw in the fabric of American
justice, it corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the conduct
of the American nation. It will make us truer to ourselves as
a country and as a people. 203
199 Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) rev'd on other grounds,
329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing policy reasons for honoring international human
rights obligations). See generally U.S. v. Schiffer, 836 F.Supp. 1164, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(explaining distinction between customary international law and commonly accepted
international law principles in assessing the weight of an international obligation).
200 Beharry, 183 F.Supp.2d at 601 (stating obligations United States has due to its
moral role in global politics).
201 Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 179-80, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding in favor of
petitioner aliens because statute barring discretionary waiver of deportation could not be
applied retroactively to petitioners).
202 Id. at 143, 151 (analyzing tension between progressive and oppressive trends
throughout history of United States in defining citizenship).
203 Id. at 146 (arguing that President Johnson's statement ushered in a new regime
based on principle that "immigrants deserved to be treated fairly"); see Michael R. Currin,
Flickering Lamp Beside the Golden Door: Immigration, the Constitution, & Undocumented
Aliens in the 1990's, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 58, 100 (1998) (noting that President
Johnson's sentiments were shared by growing civil rights movement, as well as many
church and civic organizations).
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This wrong that was so prevalent were discriminatory
"xenophobic" policies that existed prior to the INA.204 In theory,
the INA was to change policy so that "the issue was no longer
whom we shall welcome, but how many, and how they could be
treated with dignity, due process and equality as legal residents
once they arrived."205 Were we to follow the underlying premise
behind adopting the INA, refugees would be afforded the
protections that are required under the 1951 Convention and
Protocol. 206 In Mojica, Judge Weinstein focused on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 207  as a guide in statutory
construction-and again pointed out the responsibility Congress
has to create laws in accordance with international agreements,
in that Congress is "the lawmaker of the leading proponent of
international human rights law."208 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, similar to the 1951 Convention and Protocol, is
an agreement to which the United States is bound-especially
considering the high expectations the U.S. places on other
204 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Social Movements and Law Reform: Channeling:
Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 430 (noting that
the exclusionary immigration policy of United States before the 1965 amendment to the
INA excluded homosexuals, bisexuals, and those with specified physical disorders under
the euphemism "people afflicted with psychopathic personalities"); see also Patricia I.
Folan-Sebben, U.S. Immigration Law, Irish Immigration and Diversity: Cead Mile Failte
(A Thousand Times Welcome)?, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 745, 754-55 (1992) (describing
national policy behind the quota system as one designed to ensure homogenous American
population); Janice Alfred, Denial of the American Dream: The Plight of Undocumented
High School Students Within the U.S. Educational System, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.
615, 621 (2003) (noting that focus of American immigration policy after 1960's shifted to
focus on "family reunification" and emigration of foreigners with strong "job-skills").
205 Mojica, 970 F.Supp. at 146 (noting growth of non-discriminatory immigration
system in United States since the end of World War II).
206 See Gretchen Bortchelt, The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union:
A Misguided Approach to Asylum Law and a Violation of International Human Rights
Standards, 33 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 473, 474-75 (2002) (proposing that nations
depart from the Convention's standard because they disregard the distinction between
refugees and immigrants); Fitzpatrick, supra note 169, at 3 (noting that divergence of
U.S. refugee law from international standards results from an inconsistent treatment of
international norms in determining the meaning of "persecution", and in following views
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees). See generally Harris, supra note 66, at 271-
72 (stating that INA used the definition of "refugee" used by the 1951 Convention and
that Congress further attempted to meet the UN standard in the Refugee Act of 1980).
207 Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (referring to Universal
Declaration of Human rights as adopted on Dec. 10, 1948, United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 217A (111), reprinted in International Human Rights Instruments
440.1 (2d ed. 1990)). Cf. Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1177, 1189 (D. Conn. 1980)
(interpreting Connecticut statute concerning prisoner treatment using UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners).
208 Mojica, 970 F.Supp. at 147 (arguing that Congress is aware that it is bound to
follow international law without an "overriding national policy").
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nations to comply with human rights standards.209 Judge
Weinstein pointed to two provisions in his discussion, which
directly apply to the obligation of the U.S. to terminate an LPR's
refugee status before placing him in deportation proceedings:
Article 9, which provides that no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary ... exile, and Article 10, "everyone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations .... "210
While Judge Weinstein is referring to the Declaration of
Human Rights provisions in this case as being construed to
reflect the right to stay of a lawfully present long term alien, it
certainly has application to refugee LPR's, regardless of the
length of time they have been present in the United States. 211
Subjecting a person who enters as a refugee to deportation,
without first evaluating whether the circumstances creating the
refugee's situation still exist, can certainly be considered
arbitrary. 212 Furthermore, Article 10's requirement of a fair and
public hearing to determine rights and obligations of an alien
209 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one that creates an "expectation of adherence",
and is one of the few documents that provides "an authoritative statement of the
international community"); lgartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 386 F.3d 313, 318 (1st
Cir. 2004) (Toruella, J., dissenting) (illustrating circumstances under which the Court has
referred to Universal Declaration of Human Rights). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004) (stating that U.S. has ratified the Declaration as an
international standard rather than enforceable law).
210 Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 147.
211 See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 147-49 (suggesting that rights of due process should
be applied to aliens to avoid potential for arbitrary expulsion). See generally Parrish,
supra note 97, at 258 (concluding that the "final step in the development of international
refugee law should then be to identify refugee law completely with the human rights that
are internationally recognized"); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 17 (1994) (stating that Universal Declaration of Human Rights has made it so human
rights is "treated as a major factor in extending UN activity, for example, in regard to
refugees and migration").
212 See generally Lucy Halatyn, Political Asylum and Equal Protection: Hypocrisy
United States Protection of Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 133,
149 (1998) (arguing that while the Constitution "declares a treaty shall be considered the
supreme law of the land", United States has treated international treaties, like the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as non-self-executing); Hathaway, supra note 18,
at 116 (discussing problem of States failing to comply with international human rights
obligations); see Lory Diana Rosenberg, International Association of Refugee Law Judges
Conference: The Courts and Interception: The United States' Interdiction Experience and
Its Impact on Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199, 216-17 (noting that
critics of United States' policy of expedited removal claim that such policies serve to
frustrate fundamental human rights of asylum seekers as guaranteed by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
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suggests that a hearing is necessary to determine the status of a
refugee before subjecting them to deportation. 213 The refugee has
a right under international law to be protected from return to a
place they fear according to the Convention refugee definition,
and deserves to be evaluated under the provisions of the
Convention and Protocol to see if they meet the criteria for either
cancellation or cessation of the status before being placed in
deportation proceedings. 214 If their refugee status cannot be
terminated, then the United States is obligated to allow the
refugee to remain in the U.S.215 In essence, they may be stripped
of their LPR status, but they will revert back to their refugee
status.
These statements take on particular meaning, when
considering that the U.S. recently joined other state signatories
213 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10 1948, Art. '10 available at
www.un.org/overview/rights.html (last visited August 20, 2005) (asserting that
"[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him"); see Dorean Marguerite Koenig, Independence of the Judiciary in
Civil Cases & Executive Branch Interference in the United States: Violations of
International Standards Involving Prisoners and other Despised Groups, 21 DAYTON L.
REV. 719, 726-27 (1996) (noting Article 10 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights
clearly provides for an independent judiciary and a fair and public hearing for all
persons). See generally Hathaway, supra note 18, at 116 (arguing that international
human rights standards break down as governments employ defensive strategies
designed to avoid international responsibility for refugees).
214 See Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473-74 (BIA 1987) (interim decision)
(suggesting that "[i]nstead of focusing only on the circumvention of orderly refugee
procedures, the totality of the circumstances and actions of an alien in his flight from the
country where he fears persecution should be examined in determining whether a
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted"); Coonan, supra note 49, at 607 (noting that
in acceding to 1967 Protocol, United States bound itself to Article 33 of the 1951
Convention by incorporation which provides that signatory nations not return any refugee
to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened). See generally Karen
Musalo, United States Department of Justice Executive Office of Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals, Falls Church, Virginia, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 373, 404 (1998) (arguing that "because the denial of political asylum to a refugee
could result in the return of that person to a situation of persecution, legitimate bases of
denial should be somewhat circumscribed").
215 See Megan Annitto, Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence: Is Protection
Possible After In Re R-A-?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 817 (2000) (stating that under present
authority, "governments are obligated to protect victims who face persecution or torture
in their own countries"); Lori A. Nessel, 'Willful Blindness" to Gender.Based Violence
Abroad: United States' Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 162 n.34 (2004) (acknowledging "pursuant to the
Refugee Convention, the United States is obligated not to return a person to a country in
which her life or freedom would be threatened"); see also Boed, supra note 179, at 152-53
(asserting that "unless the alien's status as a refugee has been terminated within the one-
year period... the alien is eligible for an adjustment of status from refugee to lawful
permanent resident," thus enjoying the privileges of remaining in United States and
qualifying for naturalization).
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to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol in reaffirming the
adherence to its provisions in December of 2001.216 Within the
structure of the meeting, a Declaration of the States Parties to
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol was adopted by
consensus. 217 The U.S. being a party reaffirmed its commitment
to implementing the 1967 Protocol, and committed to uphold the
values it instills. 218 The authority of the UNHCR, as the institute
with the mandate to protect refugees, and the obligation of state
parties to cooperate with UNHCR was also reiterated. 219 In his
concluding remarks, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, the Commissioner of the
UNHCR, firmly stated that the meeting and declarations made
there within confirm "the 1951 Refugee Convention and its
Protocol remain fully relevant and valid."220
216 See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 28, Item 6, U.N. Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/01
(noting that Ministerial Meeting was held in Geneva on December 12 and 13, 2001 to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Convention and that United States was
represented at the meeting); Ronald Smith, Outsourcing Refugee Protection
Responsibilities: The Second Life of an Unconscionable Idea, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
137, 148 (2004).(pointing out that parties to 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol met in
Geneva on December of 2001 to discuss the Convention and its continued relevance). See
generally Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Statement by the
Permanent Council on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Adoption of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, PC.JOUR361 (Oct. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2001/decisions/pces361.pdf (welcoming UNHCR and
"reaffirming the fundamental importance of the Office" of the UNHCR "as the
multilateral institution with the mandate to protect refugees and to find durable solutions
to their problems").
217 See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 28, at Annex 1, Operative 1 (unanimously
stating that countries "reaffirm our commitment to implement our obligations under the
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol fully and effectively in accordance with the
object and purpose of these instruments"). See generally Smith, supra note 216, at 148
(noting agreement by states that Convention "should be further developed and
strengthened").
218 See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 28, at Annex 1, Operative 8 (explaining
need for respect of rights and freedoms of refugees and international cooperation with
UNHCR to resolve the plight of refugees). See generally Smith, supra note 216, at 148
(noting that parties agreed to engage in coordinated efforts to uphold principals of
Convention and Protocol).
219 See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 28, at Annex 1, Operative 8 (seeking to
"reaffirm the fundamental importance of UNHCR as the multilateral institution with the
mandate to provide international protection to refugees and to promote durable solutions,
and recall our obligations as State Parties to cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise of
its functions"). See generally Smith, supra note 216, at 148 (acknowledging continuing
importance of Convention and Protocol).
220 See Ministerial Meeting, supra note 28, at Annex IX (stating that "Delegations at
this Ministerial Meeting have unanimously declared that the Convention and its Protocol
are key for the Protection of refugees, and they have reaffirmed their desire to continue
with it").
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Keeping Matter of V-S- In Mind...
In Matter of V-S-, the Respondent in removal proceedings
discussed above, was convicted of conspiracy to commit
extortion. 221 While this is not an acceptable form of behavior for
any resident-citizen or alien-the respondent is clearly not a
danger to society. His presence in the United States, now over
ten years time, is certainly not a threat to national security. His
subjection to deportation proceedings is based on harsh changes
to the INA that render aliens who committed non-violent, fairly
non-serious crimes deportable. The risks to the respondent's
safety and his fear of return likely outweigh any burden on the
United States that his continued presence may cause. If the
government does not allow for an evaluation of these
circumstances, and determine whether his refugee status has
terminated, they are directly violating international regulations
of refugees under the 1951 Convention and Protocol. 222
CONCLUSION
The United States is obligated, as a State Party to the 1967
Protocol, to protect those persons deemed refugees to the fullest
extent provides in the international agreement. 223 Except when
221 Matter of V-S-, I. & N. Dec. A70-325-281 at 2 (Jan. 9, 2004) (interlocutory order).
222 See Joni Andrioff, Note, Providing the Existence of Persecution in Asylum and
Withholding Claims, 62 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 107, 114 (1985) (noting that "well-founded
fear standard allowed for the consideration of subjective factors, such as the alien's
opinions and statements, as well as objective factors in assessing the likelihood that an
alien would face persecution if deported"). But see Holinka, supra note 89, at 425 (noting
sentiment of some critics "that adhering to the standards of the Protocol would require an
individualized' evaluation for every crime and an individualized assessment of
dangerousness to the community"); Christopher M. Kozoll, Poisoning the Well:
Persecution, the Environment, and Refugee Status, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
271, 275-76 (2004) (asserting that "[w]hile the Convention and the Protocol define and
govern international standards for the evaluation and processing of refugee claims, any
individual attempting to claim asylum in the U.S. must do so under U.S. laws; the
treaties have been interpreted as not self-executing treaties, and have also been analyzed
as providing an applicant no further rights than U.S. domestic laws").
223 See Bien, supra note 65, at 802-03 (stating that "the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and in its 1967 Protocol
(1967 Protocol), impose on countries the obligation to protect any individual, outside her
country of origin, found to have a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion");
Josh Briggs, Sur Place Refugee Status In The Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in
Hong Kong, 42 Am. U.L. REV. 433, 444 (1993) (clarifying the "doctrine of non-refoulement
does not prohibit a state from expelling a refugee from its territory, but it forbids the
refoulement or return of a refugee to any country or territory where the refugee's life or
freedom would be endangered"); Suzanne Gluck, Intercepting Refugees At Sea: An
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refugee status ceases to exist because of the application of a
Cessation clause, or circumstances in which fraud or misconduct
in the finding of refugee status justify cancellation, a refugee
remains a refugee and should enjoy all of the protections as such
when s/he adjusts status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident.
It is imperative that we formally adopt the contention that
refugee status does not cease to exist upon adjusting to Lawful
Permanent Resident Status so that Courts may uniformly apply
the statutory refugee laws of this county. To allow Courts to
deport refugees to countries to which they will be faced with
persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a
social group, or political opinion violates humanitarian principles
that the U.S. undertook to follow.224 It is time that the U.S.
rectify the inconsistencies between its own immigration practices
and its human rights expectations of other nations.
Analysis of the United States' Legal and Moral Obligations, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 866
(1993) (concluding "the United States is required to protect those aliens who possess
individual, well-founded fears of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality,
social group, or political opinion").
224 See April Adell, Fear of Persecution for Opposition to Violations Of the
International Human Right to Found a Family as a Legal Entitlement to Asylum for
Chinese Refugees, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 789, 816 (1996) (advancing proposition that courts
should depart from prior precedent and "interpret the statutory Refugee Act phrase
'persecution on account of political opinion' consistently with legislative purpose,
international treaty law, and international human rights law"); Abigail D. King,
Interdiction: The United States' Continuing Violation Of International Law, 68 B.U.L.
REV. 773, 792-93 (1988) (noting UNHCR has been "consistently emphasizing the necessity
for states to observe humanitarian principles toward refugees"); Parrish, supra note 97, at
258 (noting that Declaration of Human Rights has been "almost universally accepted and
repeatedly reaffirmed" and further arguing that no state can legitimately argue that the
Declaration is not valid, at least as an aspiration for its citizens).
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